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RECENT CASES
Conflict of Laws-Mexican Bilateral Divorce Decree
Recognized Even Though Neither Party was a Mexican
Domiciliary At Time of Divorce
In 1962, plaintiff brought an action to annul his marriage on the
ground that his wife's divorce from her former husband was invalid.
Plaintiff and defendant had been married in New York in 1956.
In 1954, defendant's former husband, one Felix Kaufmann, had ob-
tained a Mexican divorce from her on grounds not recognized in
New York' To do so, Kaufmann entered Juarez, Mexico, presented
his divorce petition together with a certificate attesting to his registra-
tion in the official register of residence of Juarez, 2 and returned to
the United States on the same day. Defendant appeared by attorney
on the following day, and, submitting to the jurisdiction of the court,
admitted the allegations of the complaint. The decree of divorce3
was entered the same day, and defendant subsequently married
plaintiff. The trial court, in the instant case, granted judgment for
the plaintiff,4 holding that the Mexican tribunal had no power to
grant the divorce decree since neither party to the action had estab-
lished domicile5 in Mexico. The appellate division reversed, uphold-
ing the bilateral divorce decree.6 On appeal to the Court of Appeals
of New York, held, affirmed. A balanced public policy requires that
a bilateral Mexican divorce be recognized even though (1) neither
party is domiciled within that jurisdiction, and (2) the only relation-
1. The decree was obtained in the First Civil Court, District of Bravos, City of
Juarez, State of Chihuahua, Mexico, on grounds of ill treatment and incompatibility
of character. New York courts will not grant a divorce on these grounds, adultery
being the sole ground for divorce there. See N.Y. DoM. REL. LA v § 170.
2. The New York Supreme Court determined that the applicable Mexican statutes
authorized the Mexican court to exercise in personam jurisdiction predicated upon
"residence" of at least one of the parties to the divorce action. The statutes specify
that "residence" is proved by personal registration with the Municipal Clerk at the
City Hall. The judgment in the principal case was recognized as valid by the Republic
of Mexico. Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel, 43 Misc. 2d 462, 473, 251 N.Y.S.2d 565, 577
(Sup. Ct. 1964).
3. This is called a bilateral Mexican divorce. Either both parties are before the
court, or one party is physically present and the other appears by counsel. Neither
party is a Mexican domiciliary. See Berke, The Present Status of Mexican Divorces,
36 N.Y.S.B.J. 111, 112 (1964).
4. Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel, 43 Misc. 2d 462, 251 N.Y.S.2d 565 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
5. Physical presence in a place and the intent to make one's fixed and permanent
home "forthwith" in that place are the elements of domicile. GooDRIcH, CoNFLICT OF
LAWs 41-43 (4th ed. 1964).
6. Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel, 21 App. Div. 2d 635, 253 N.Y.S.2d 206 (1st Dep't 1964).
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ship between the marriage status of the parties and that jurisdiction
is composed of one party's statutory "residence" based on brief contact
and the other partys voluntary appearance by attorney before the
decree-rendering court.7 Rosentiel v. Rosenstiel, 16 N.Y.2d 64, 209
N.E.2d 709, 262 N.Y.S.2d 86 (1965).
In order for a court to have jurisdiction of a divorce action, it is
generally required that at least one of the parties be domiciled within
the territorial jurisdiction of the court.8 Indeed, the United States
Supreme Court has said that a divorce decree of one state need not
be given "full faith and credit"9 in a sister state unless at least one
of the parties was domiciled within the decree-rendering state at
the time of the action.10 The traditional rationale for this theory is
that a divorce action is a proceeding in rem." The marriage status
is considered to be the res and its location is the domicile of either
12
of the married parties. 13 This view has lost much of its former
7. See also Wood v. Wood, 41 Misc. 2d 95, 245 N.Y.S.2d 800 (Sup. Ct. 1963),
modified,_22 App. Div. 2d 660, 253 N.Y.S.2d 204 (1st Dep't 1964), aff'd, 16 N.Y.2d
64, 209 N.E.2d 709, 262 N.Y.S.2d 86 (1965) (companion case in which court upheld
Mexican bilateral divorce even though plaintiff did not acquire a certificate of residence).
8. Mr. Jiistice Frankfurter's frequently quoted dictum stated the rule in this way:
"Under our system of law, judicial power to grant a divorce-jurisdiction, strictly
speaking-is founded on domicile. . . .The framers of the Constitution were familiar
with this- jurisdictional prerequisite, and since 1789 neither this Court nor any other
court in-the English-speaking world has questioned it.... The domicile of one spouse
within a state gives power to that State, we have held, to dissolve a marriage
wheresoever contracte t." Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 229-30 (1945).
See GooDmen, op. cit. supra note 5, at 256-57; 2A NELSON, DIVORCE AND ANNULMENT
§ 21.01 (2d ed. 19B1); RFsTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICTS OF LA WS §§ 110-13
(Tent. Draft No, 1, 1953).
-9- U.S. CoNsr. art. IV, § 1.
10. Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S, 287 (1942). There can be inquiry into
the jurisdictional facts when the divorce is granted ex parte. Williams v. North
Carolina, supra note 8. Participation by a party in the action, either by appearance
or cross petition, will preclude him from attacking the decree. Coe v. Coe, 334 U.S.
378 (1948); Sheerer v. Sheerer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948); Davis v. Davis, 305 U.S. 32
(1938).. Third parties will also be precluded where those through whom they claim
are precluded or. where an attack would be barred in the rendering state. Cook v.
Cook, 342 U.S. 126 (1951); Johnson v. Muelbeger, 340 U.S. 581 (1951).
11. See 2 BISHOP, MARMAE AND DIvoRcE § 164 (6th ed. 1881). A scholar notes:
"Building upon Story's concept of domicile, Joel Bishop in 1852 started to formulate
his 'status' theory of marriage which in time jelled into the notion that the marriage
was a-res and that divorce was-in the nature of an in rem proceeding." Foster, For
Better or Worse? Decisions Since Haddock v. Haddock, 47 A.B.A.J. 961, 963 (1961).
12: American courts have long recognized the ability of either spouse to establish
his' separate domicile. See, e.g., Cheever v. Wilson, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 108, 124 (1869);
Phelps v. Phelps, 241 Mo. App. 1202, 246 S.W.2d 838 (1962).
-13. "In that the divorce suit -is treated as in rem, is necessary for the forum to
have judicial jurisdiction over the matrimonial status. Since this status is intangible,
some fictitious basis for getting the res before the court had to be devised. Moreover, it
was necessary, for -the 'connecting- link for the forum to be sufficient under the due
process clause. . .. r[T]raditionally domicile has been used in this country." Sumner,
Full Faith and Credit for Divorce Decrees, 9 VARm. L. R1v. 1, 4 (1955). See, e.g.,
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vitality,14 and for purposes of establishing jurisdiction, more emphasis
is now placed on the idea that the state of domicile has a special
interest in the marriage status and a right to control the relationship
because of the moral, social, and economic consequences attendant
thereto.'5 For purposes of the competence of state courts, most state
divorce statutes employ the term "residence" 16 rather than domicile.
However, for purposes of jurisdiction, it is usually understood that the
inherent nature of divorce proceedings requires that at least one of the
parties actually be domiciled within the state.
1 7
Although the "full faith and credit" clause has no application to
decrees rendered in foreign countries, most foreign divorce decrees
will be honored by the various states.18 When recognition is with-
held, it is usually because the decree is found to contravene the forum
state's public policy.19 In regard to Mexican divorces,20 the courts of
Warner v. Warner, 219 Minn. 59, 17 N.W.2d 58 (1944) (marriage status is the
subject matter of the court's jurisdiction).
14. "[I]t does not aid in the solution of the problem presented by this case to label
these proceedings as proceedings in rem. Such a suit, however, is not a mere in
personar action. Domicl ... is recognized... as essential in order to give the court
jurisdiction which will entitle the divorce decree to extra-territorial effect.
Williams v. North Carolina, supra note 10, at 297.
15. See, e.g., id. at 298 (state has a legitimate concern in marital status of its
domiciliaries); Alton v. Alton, 207 F.2d 667, 673 (3d Cir. 1953) (there is mutual
intimate concern between state and its domiciliaries); Fearon v. Treanor, 272 N.Y.
268, 273, 5 N.E.2d 815, 816 (1936) (successful marriages constitute fundamental
basis of state's general welfare); GooDnicr, op. cit. supra note 5, at 256; Lorenzen,
Haddock v. Haddock Overruled, 52 YALE L.J. 341 (1943); Note, 16 VAND. L. flv.
1185, 1189 (1963). A divorce action has been characterized as a three party action
in which the state is always involved. Trammel v. Vaughan, 158 Mo. 214, 222, 59
S.W. 79, 81 (1900).
16. "Residence" is readily distinguishable because it requires only physical presence
at an established habitat without any intention to make a home there. 2A NELsoN, op.
cit. supra note 8, § 21.14; see note 5 supra.
17. 2A NmEsoN, op. cit. supra note 8, §§ 21.12, 21.14; see Carter v. Carter, 147
Conn. 238, 240-41, 159 A.2d 173, 175-76 (1960); Martin v. Martin, 253 N.C. 704,
706, 118 S.E.2d 29, 31 (1961). The required period of residence is not essential to
domicile, but is merely a statutory requirement apart from domicile. Stimson,
Jurisdiction in Divorce Cases: The Unsoundness of the Domiciliary Theory, 42 A.B.A.J.
222, 294 (1956). Apart from the so-called "servicemen's statutes" explained in Note,
supra note 15, at 1194, only an Arkansas statute has frankly substituted "residence"
for domicile in all divorce cases. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-1208.1 (1962). The Arkansas
Supreme Court upheld the statute in Wheat v. Wheat, 229 Ark. 842, 318 S.W.2d
793 (1958). But see Alton v. Alton, supra note 15 (Virgin Islands statute dispensing
with domicile held unconstitutional).
18. Courts often explain such recognition as being an application of the principles of
comity. "'Comity' . ..is the recognition which one nation allows within its territory
to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both
to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens or of
other persons who are under the protection of its laws." Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S.
113, 164 (1895).
19. See Christopher v. Christopher, 198 Ga. 361, 31 S.E.2d 818 (1944); Rosen-
baum v. Rosenbaum, 309 N.Y. 371, 130 N.E.2d 902 (1955); Martens v. Martens, 284
N.Y. 363, 31 N.E.2d 489 (1940). The courts also give other reasons for the non-
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most states hold as a matter of public policy that at least one of the
parties must be a Mexican domiciliary at the time of the divorce.
For example, all are in agreement that mail-order decrees21 are legal
nullities.P Similarly, Mexican ex parte decrees are denied effect
when no domicile is proved.23 However, there is a difference of
judicial opinion regarding a bilateral divorce decree24 in which neither
party is a domiciliary of Mexico. Three of the four states25 that have
considered the question find such decrees contrary to their public
policies and hence invalid.26 New York courts, however, have con-
sistently looked only to the decree to, see that Mexican jurisdictional
requirements were satisfied,27 and have refused to consider whether
bonafide domicile of either party existed.
recognition of foreign divorce decrees; most of them are actually interrelated with the
forum's public policy. For instance, decrees have been refused recognition in these
circumstances: where the decree was wanting in integrity, Lotz v. Lotz, 49 N.Y.S.2d
319 (Sup. Ct. 1944); where the foreign court had no jurisdiction to render the decree,
Hansen v. Hansen, 255 App. Div. 1016, 8 N.Y.S.2d 655 (2d Dep't 1938); where
neither party was a domiciliary of the foreign country, Bobala v. Bobala, 680 Ohio
App. 63, 33 N.E.2d 845 (1940); and where the decree was obtained by fraud, Ryder
v. Ryder, 2 Cal. App. 2d 426, 37 P.2d 1069 (3d Dist. 1934).
It has been observed that courts often utilize the concept of pubic policy as a
cloak for provincialism or as a substitute for analysis. Paulsen & Sovern, "Public
Policy" in the Conflict of Laws, 56 CoLum. L. Rrv. 969, 1016 (1956). Properly
speaking, courts of the forum should refuse to enforce foreign decrees only when they
"violate some fundamental principle of justice, some prevalent conception of good
morals .. Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N.Y. 99, 111, 120 N.E. 192, 202 (1918)
(Cardozo, J.).
20. An enlightening exposition of Mexican divorce law is contained in Comment, 33
FoRDHAm L. Rv. 449, 462-64 (1965).
21. Mail order decrees are those granted in an action in which neither party appears
physically and both submit to the jurisdiction of the court. See Caldwell v. Caldwell,
298 N.Y. 146, 81 N.E.2d 60 (1948).
22. See, e.g., Tonti v. Chadwick, 1 N.J. 531, 64 A.2d 436 (1949); Caldwell v.
Caldwell, supra note 21.
23. See, e.g., Rosenbaum v. Rosenbaum, supra note 19; Davis v. Davis, 80 Ohio L.
Abs. 303, 156 N.E.2d 494 (C.P. 1959).
24. See note 3 supra.
25. New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, and Ohio.
26. The lack of domicile of either party was held fatal to the validity of the
decree in each case. Warrender v. Warrender, 79 N.J. Super. 114, 190 A.2d 684
(App. Div. 1963), aff'd mein., 42 N.J. 287, 200 A.2d 123 (1964); Golden v. Golden,
41 N.M. 356, 68 P.2d 928 (1937); Bobala v. Bobala, 68 Ohio App. 63, 33 N.E.2d 845
(1940). Each of these forums has been faced with this problem only once.
27. See, e.g., Heine v. Heine, 231 N.Y.S.2d 239 (Sup. Ct. 1962), afl'd mein., 19
App. Div. 2d 695, 242 N.Y.S.2d 705 (2d Dep't 1963); Weibel v. Weibel, 37 Misc. 2d
162, 234 N.Y.S.2d 298 (Sup. Ct. 1962); Busk v. Busk, 229 N.Y.S.2d 904 (Sup. Ct.),
modified mere., 18 App. Div. 2d 700, 236 N.Y.S.2d 336 (2d Dep't 1962); Laff v.
Laff, 5 Misc. 2d 554, 160 N.Y.S.2d 933 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd mein., 4 App. Div. 2d 874,
166 N.Y.S. 2d 678 (2d Dep't 1957); Caswell v. Caswell, 111 N.Y.S. 2d 875 (Sup. Ct.),
aff'd mein., 117 N.Y.S. 2d 326 (1st Dep't 1952). The New York courts have upheld
dozens of these Mexican bilateral divorces. It has been estimated that over 200,000
New Yorkers have obtained Mexican divorces. N.Y. Times, July 8, 1964, p. 34, col.
2. In fact, the only cases holding bilateral Mexican divorces invalid have done so
[VeOL. 19
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The court of appeals28 noted that, in compliance with the Mexican
jurisdictional requirements, Kaufmann was physically present in the
jurisdiction, and that the defendant voluntarily submitted to Mexican
judicial authority.29 Thus, on the theory that the marriage status
moves from place to place with either spouse, the Mexican court
was held to have acquired jurisdiction over the marriage. 30 The
court rejected domicile as an indispensable prerequisite to jurisdiction,
commenting that it had earlier dispensed with the need for domicile
in certain other types of divorce situations.31 In conclusion, the court
reasoned that since the New York public interest is not prejudiced
more by "quickie" Mexican divorces than by "quickie" Nevada
divorces,32 recognition of bilateral Mexican divorces as a matter of
comity offends no public policy of the state.3 The concurring and
dissenting opinions4 would hold this divorce invalid. Judge Scileppi,
dissenting, felt that New York public policy demands that for purposes
of divorce foreign courts should not be found to have acquired juris-
diction, unless one of the parties to the divorce is a domiciliary of the
foreign country, or unless there is at least a "relationship of substantial
permanence" between the decree-rendering nation and the marital
status.35  Both the concurring and the dissenting judges reasoned
because defendants lacked adequate representation by counsel. See Molnar v. Molnar,
131 N.Y.S.2d 120 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd mem., 284 App. Div. 948, 135 N.Y.S.2d 623 (1st
Dep't 1954); MacPherson v. MacPherson, 1 Misc. 2d 1049, 149 N.Y.S.2d 525 (Sup.
Ct. 1956).
28. Judge Bergan wrote the majority opinion in which three other members of the
court fully concurred. Chief judge Desmond rejected the validity of the Mexican
divorce, but concurred with the opinion because he felt that only prospective effect
should be given to invalidation. Judge Scileppi agreed with Desmond, but felt that
the rule voiding such divorces should apply to the instant case as well as to any pros-
pective cases.
29. Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel, 16 N.Y.2d 64, 209 N.E.2d 709, 711-12, 262 N.Y.S.2d
86, 89-90 (1965).
30. "[Ailmost universally jurdisdiction is acquired by physical and personal
submission to judicial authority and in legal theory there seems to be ground to admit
that the Mexican court at Juarez acquired jurisdiction over the former marriage of
the defendant." Id., at 209 N.E.2d at 712, 262 N.Y.S.2d at 90.
31. Ibid. New York will take jurisdiction of a matrimonial action without regard
to domicile if the marriage was contracted in New York. N.Y. Dom. REL. LAw § 170;
see, e.g., David-Zieseniss v. Zieseniss, 205 Misc. 836, 129 N.Y.S.2d 649 (Sup. Ct.
1954). The court of appeals recognized a judgment of divorce granted in France on
the ground of adultery even though the parties were not domiciliaries of France.
Could v. Gould, 235 N.Y. 14, 138 N.E. 490 (1923).
32. Such a sister-state divorce is often obtained by means of a synthetic domicile
established by purely formal gestures.
33. The court distinguished this case from those involving mail-order decrees or ex
parte decrees, in which domicile is not established, or in which there is no personal
service of process and submission to the court's jurisdiction by the defendant. Such
decrees are still held to be void. Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel, 16 N.Y.2d 64, 209 N.E.2d
709, 711, 262 N.Y.S.2d 86, 89 (1965); see notes 21-23 supra.
34. See note 28 supra.




that the compelled acceptance of Nevada decrees provides no reason
for the voluntary acceptance. of divorces inimical to the state's
valid interest. Furthermore, recognition of these divorces is violative
of New York's restrictive divorce policy,' and amounts to the writing
of a new state policy which conflicts with the 160-year-old single-
ground divorce statute.37
Although the court of appeals faithfully followed twenty-seven
years of almost unbroken lower court precedent,s this opinion seems
contrary to New York's divorce policy as enunciated by that state's
legislature, and appears to run counter to the better-reasoned views
as to a state's proper interest in the lives of its citizens. Rosenstiel is
contrary to legislative policy because it allows the easy circumven-
tion of the state's highly restrictive divorce statute. Legislative
controls enforcing such policy can be evaded by any New Yorker
willing to invest in a one day trip to Juarez.39 However, the argument
is made that a pragmatic consideration of the effect of the ancient
divorce statute should be made by the courts. The statute's strict
rules, long criticized40 and probably not attuned to modem attitudes
and mores, has caused an exodus of couples with unhappy marriages
to forums having more lenient divorce provisions. 41 Judicial recogni-
tion of these foreign divorces may be viewed as a compensating
factor42 which adjusts the unique New York statute to modern
realities.43 It may be significant that despite the legislature's aware-
ness of this migratory divorce practice, it has yet specifically to repri-
mand the courts for their recognition of such decrees.44 Still, judicial
36. It was felt that New York's prior policy had been to restrict the availability of
divorce by not allowing "casual and consensual" divorces, and in so doing to "pre-
serve the family unit." Id. at 80, 209 N.E.2d at 720, 262 N.Y.S.2d at 101.
37. It was felt that the statute was defeated because it was now easily evaded.
Id. at 73, 209 N.E.2d at 715, 15, 262 N.Y.S.2d at 94-95. See N.Y. DoM. REL. LAw §
170. Judge Desmond ruefully noted that acceptance of these divorces put New York
"in the uneasy and inappropriate position of sole acceptor of Mexican 'quickie' divorces."
Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel, supra at 72, 209 N.E.2d at 714, 262 N.Y.S.2d at 93.
38. See note 27 supra. It has been suggested that the conception of marriage as
a status, with its corresponding jurisdictional requirement based on domicile, has never
been fully accepted in New York. SIEGEL, COMIMENTARY ON THE Domus'nc RELA-
TIONS LAw 15-16 (1964).
39. The average expenditure is about $500. Time, July 25, 1965, p. 62.
40. "New York has divorce laws of unusual stringency considerably mitigated by
perjury and collusion. . . . [I]n at least a third of the divorces granted in this State
the infidelity is fictitious .... These things are the natural consequences of a divorce law
which is out of harmony with the present opinion of a large part of the public. .. ."
N.Y. Times, April 22, 1922, p. 8, col. 3. A modem commentator characterizes the
statute as being "cruel and inhuman" because of its disregard of psychological reality.
SIEGEL, op. cit. supra note 38, at 18-19.
41. See note 27 supra.
42. See Comment, supra note 20, at 465.
43. SIEGEL, Op. cit. supra note 38, at 18.
44. See Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel, supra note 6, at 638, 253 N.Y.S.2d at 209 (ap-
pellate division felt that legislature's inaction is significant).
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sanctioning of such conduct is apt to foster disrespect for the law;
and it certainly discriminates against those lacking the resources for
such a maneuver. Any problems caused by the statute can, and
should, be remedied by the people, acting through their legislature,
45
but the likelihood of any liberalization of the divorce statute is les-
sened by the continued acceptance of easily obtained foreign
divorces.4 It must be acknowledged that the court's failure to require
that there be at least a "relationship of substantial permanence"
4 7
between the decree-rendering forum and the marriage status largely
destroys the effectiveness of any worthy controls imposed by the New
York statute.48 New York's vital interest in the marriage status of its
citizens is in danger of being forfeited because of the voluntary
acceptance of divorces rendered by a forum having no such interest.
49
The minority judges seem to have best satisfied the basic value
judgments of a rational state divorce policy by their insistence that
New York's full control of this marriage not be defeated by the failure
to demand a substantially permanent relationship between Mexico
and the marriage status of Mr. and Mrs. Kaufmann.
45. See Comment, 39 Comzr.. L.Q. 293, 302-03 (1954). "No Court is licensed to
write a new State policy, however attractive or convenient." Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel,
supra note 29, at 73, 209 N.E.2d at 715, 262 N.Y.S.2d at 94 (Desmond, I., concurring).
46. "[T]he easier it is made for those who through affluence are able to exercise
disproportionately large influence on legislation, to obtain migratory divorces, the less
likely it is that the divorce laws of their home states will be liberalized . . . so as
to affect all." Sheerer v. Sheerer, supra note 10, at 370 n.18 (Frankfurter, J., dis-
senting).
47. Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel, supra note 29, at 86, 209 N.E.2d at 717, 262 N.Y.S.2d
at 97 (Scileppi, J., dissenting). The dissents refusal to demand technical domicile
avoids some of the difficulties inherent in the application of that concept. See Williams
v. North Carolina, supra note 10, at 258 (Rutledge, J., dissenting) (few legal con-
ceptions afford such possibilities for uncertain application as domicile); Sumner, supra
note 13, at 14 (no longer a practical base for divorce jurisdiction).
48. See Comment, supra note 45, at 302. It is obvious that the New York legisla-
ture cannot control the marital status of New York citizens as it ostensibly intended to
with the enactment of N.Y. DoM. REL. LAw § 170.
49. The Mexican law pays little heed to the maintenance of the marriage or reasons
for its dissolution. Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel, supra note 29, at 71, 209 N.E.2d at
714, 262 N.Y.S.2d at 92 (Desmond, J., concurring). The concepts of domicile and
marriage "status" are unimportant in the Chihuahua Law of Divorce. Comment, supra
note 20, at 463; see Lorenzen, supra note 15, at 352-53.
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Constitutional Law-Section 504 of LMRDA a
Bill of Attainder
Defendant was convicted of violating section 504 of the Labor
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959,1 which prohibits
a member of the Communist Party from serving on the executive
board of a labor organization. Defendant openly belonged to the
Communist Party during his three terms as a board member of Local
10, International Longshoremen's Union. The Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals, reversing the district court, held that section 504 violated
the first amendment by infringing upon freedom of association and
the fifth amendment by failing to require specific intent as an element
of the crime2. On certiorari from the Supreme Court, held, affirmed. A
penal statute which names with particularity the persons or group
on whom its sanction is to fall is a bill of attainder whether the
purpose of the sanction is retributive or preventive.3 United States v.
Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965).
The interpretive history of the constitution's bills of attainder clauses
may be divided into two parts. The first began with Fletcher v. Peck4
when the Supreme Court adopted what has come to be known as the
"functional" approach,5 the concept being that the bills of attainder
clauses were intended to be very broad prohibitions upon the power of
the legislature to punish particular persons or members of an easily
identifiable group without the benefit of a judicial trial.6 Such a view
explicitly rejected the contention that "bill of attainder" was capable
of narrow historical definition or that the bills of attainder clauses were
1. Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (Landrum-Griffin Act)
§ 504, 73 Stat. 536, 29 U.S.C. § 504 (1964), is entitled "Prohibition against certain
persons holding office; violations and penalties." It states: "No person who is or has
been a member of the Communist Party ...shall serve (1) as an officer, director,
trustee, member of any executive board . . .of any labor organization . . .during or
for five years after the termination of his membership in the Communist Party ... .
There is a similar provision for certain classes of convicted felons.
2. United States v. Brown, 334 F.2d 488 (9th Cir. 1964), aff'd, 381 U.S. 437 (1965).
3. The Court stated that it was unnecessary to consider the first and fifth amendment
arguments since decision on the basis of the bills of attainder clause terminated the
case. 381 U.S. at 440.
4. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810). The Court extended, by dictum, the bills of
attainder clauses to include bills of pains and penalties.
5. See Note, 72 YALE L.J. 330, 333 (1962). Under the functional approach a
court is to look to the results which followed the enactment of a bill of attainder his-
torically, and compare them to the act in question to determine if the bills of attainder
clauses are applicable.
6. Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1866). Thus, a legislative require-
ment that a person take an expurgatory oath as a condition precedent to preaching in
the state was struck down since, having found as to defendant's failure to take the
oath, a court would necessarily find defendant guilty. As the legislature had passed
the requirement, this amounted to a legislative trial without judicial safeguards.
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technical restrictions on the rule-making powers of the legislatures and
looked, instead, to the historical results which followed when a bill of
attainder was passed.7 Legislative bodies could make only rules of
general applicability, and it was left to the courts to determine what
persons fit the general rule. A single exception to the prohibition
against naming particular persons or groups was made where general
characteristics were expressed by shorthand designation.8 The second
period began with American Communications Ass'n v. Douds,9 where
the constitutional definition of bill of attainder was significantly nar-
rowed. 10 The theory of interpretation became a "literal" one on the
basis that "bill of attainder" is an historically defined term and the
founding fathers intended only to prohibit such legislation as came
within the historical definition." Douds limited the applicability of
the bills of attainder clauses to legislative enactments punishing
particular persons or members of an easily identifiable group, which
enactment was retributive rather than preventive; was absolute in its
operation; and which operated retroactively.12 Flemming v. Nestor 3
further limited the applicability of the bills of attainder clauses by
holding that mere denial of a privilege, as opposed to a right, did
not constitute punishment for the purpose of interpreting the bills of
attainder clauses.' 4
In the instant case, the majority states that the basic purpose of
the constitutional prohibition of bills of attainder is to insure a
separation of powers. 5 To implement this purpose the Court em-
braced the broad rule laid down in United States v. Lovett 6 that
'legislative acts, no matter what their form, that apply either to
named individuals or to easily ascertainable members of a group in
such a way as to inflict punishment on them without a trial, are
bills of attainder prohibited by the Constitution." 7 Moreover, punish-
7. Id. at 322.
8. Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189 (1898) (qualifications set up for obtaining
a medical license without which one could not practice); Dent v. West Virginia, 129
U.S. 114 (1889) (convicted felons barred from practice of medicine).
9. 339 U.S. 382 (1950) (Communists barred from holding union office).
10. See Note, supra note 6. Under the literal approach a bill of attainder is a
legislative enactment punishing particular persons or members of easily identifiable
groups. The purpose of the act must be retributive, the terms unconditional and the
operation retroactive.
11. Green v. Shumway, 39 N.Y. 418, 430-31 (1868) (dissenting opinion).
12. Supra note 9.
13. 363 U.S. 603 (1960) (OASDI payments terminated to aliens deported because
of Communist Party membership).
14. Id. at 617.
15. 381 U.S. at 442-43.
16. 328 U.S. 303, 315-16 (1946) (Congressional act prohibiting payment of further
salaries to three named federal employees held to constitute a bill of attainder).
17. 381 U.S. at 448-49.
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ment is defined broadly by the Court to include acts which are
preventive in nature, as well as those which are retributive.18 The
majority concludes that Congress is limited by the bill of attainder
clauses to the making of rules of general applicability; 19 while
Congress possesses full legislative authority, the task of adjudication
must be left to the courts.2" In his dissenting opinion, Mr. Justice
White adhered to the more recent authority which restricted the
applicability of the bills of attainder clauses.21 He felt that for the
purpose of interpreting these clauses, the definition of punishment
should be limited to acts the purpose of which was retributive.
2
2
He also suggested that "Communist" is only a "shorthand designation"
for a part of a group likely to cause political strikes; that action against
a portion of a broader group has been sanctioned repeatedly;23 and
that the ability of the legislature to use shorthand designations has also
been upheld.24 In discussing the possible ramifications of the holding
in the instant case, Mr. Justice White suggested that the conflict of
interest statutes2 have been invalidated by the holding in the instant
case.- The majority, however, stated that its opinion would have
no bearing on the conflict of interest statutes since these statutes deal
with general characteristics rather than a specific group of people. 7
The legislative function is limited to the enactment of the broad
rules that will be used by the judiciary. It is the function of the
judiciary, on the other hand, to determine in a particular case
whether a general rule is applicable. In the instant case, the legisla-
tive finding that a member of the Communist Party was one of the
group likely to cause political strikes, presupposes a specific finding of
fact. While it might well be argued the Communists are likely
to cause political strikes, the possibility of controversy over this
point in a particular case prohibits legislative action; its determi-
18. Id. at 458.
19. Id. at 461.
20. Supra notes 11 & 17.
21. 381 U.S. at 478 (dissenting opinion).
22. 381 U.S. at 447.
23. 381 U.S. at 474 (dissenting opinion), citing Railway Express Agency, Inc.
v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, (1949); Semler v. Oregon State Bd. of Dental Examiners,
294 U.S. 608 (1935); New York ex rel. Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278 U.S. 63 (1928);
Patrone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 138 (1941). See also Williamson v. Lee Optical Co,,
348 U.S. 483 (1955).
24. Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955) (unlicensed persons forbidden
to fit lenses for glasses except as directed by licensed optometrist; the broad classification
includes those unqualified to fit glasses); Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys. v.
Agnew, 329 U.S. 441 (1947) (securities broker prohibited from serving as director
of member banks in Federal Reserve System; the broad classification includes those
subject to conflicting interests in such positions).
25. 18 U.S.C. §§ 205, 208 & 281 (1964).
26. 381 U.S. at 465 (dissenting opinion).
27. Id. at 453-54.
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nation is reserved by the bills of attainder clauses to the judiciary.
Mr. Justice White's analogy of the statute in the main case
to the conflict of interest statutes28 fails. In those statutes, Congress
has legislated in broad terms and there is no condemnation of a
particular group. All men are subject to the temptations attendant to
concurrent holding of two positions where the powers of one position
may be used to the benefit of the other; and all men are barred from
the holding of certain concurrent positions. 29 The Court properly
recognized the advisability of giving more latitude to a statute reg-
ulating the business affairs of government than to a statute having
the effect of political discrimination. Perhaps the most important
aspect of the instant case is that American Communications Ass'n v.
Douds0 is overruled as to its narrow definition of the term "punish-
ment": that term now includes acts which are preventive in nature
as well as those which are retributive. The distinction between right
and privilege made in Flemming v. Nestor31 was also rejected. If,
in the future, the Court is presented the questions of whether a
legislative act must be retroactive 32 and absolute33 in order to be
found a bill of attainder, it is likely that the answer will be "no" as
to those requirements also. The return to the "functional" approach
would then be complete.
28. 18 U.S.C. §§ 205, 208 & 281 (1964).
29. Receipt of compensation by members of, Congress, officers and others in matters
affecting the government is prohibited by 18 U.S.C. § 281 <1964); officials and em-
ployees of the government, Congressmen and Senators are prohibited from aiding
prosecution of a claim against the government by 18 U.S.C. § 205 (1964); interested
persons may not act as government agents by virtue of 18 U.S.C. § 208 (1964);
persons involved in issuance, flotation, underwriting, public sale or distribution of
securities are barred from positions in member banks of the Federal Reserve System
due to 12 U.S.C. § 78 (1964).
30. Supra note 9.
31. Supra note 13.





-Construction of Merger and Amendment Statutes
Defendant, an Iowa corporation, and Needham Packing Company,
a Delaware corporation, sought to combine by means of a "Plan and
Agreement of Reorganization" which required substantial charter
amendments.' These amendments, if accepted, would have trans-
ferred control of the combined Rath-Needham Corporation to the
former Needham shareholders, cut in half the book value of the
former Rath shares, and given the former Needham shares dividend
liquidation preference over those of Rath.2 In compliance with Iowa
statutes regulating charter amendments, 3 the proposed action4 was
submitted to Rath shareholders and was approved by the required
majority5 of outstanding shares of Rath. Plaintiffs, minority share-
holders of Rath,6 brought this suit in Iowa to enjoin defendants
1. The Plan and Agreement of Reorganization (hereinafter called the "plan") pro-
vided that Rath would: (1) amend its articles of incorporation to double the number
of shares of its common stock, to create a new class of preferred shares, and to
change its name to Rath-Needham Corporation; (2) issue to Needham 5.5 shares of
Rath-Needham common stock and 2 shares of Rath-Needham 800 preferred stock for
each 5 shares of Needham common stock, in exchange for all of Needham's assets,
properties, business, name and good will, (except for a liquidation fund to be used
to pay expenses in carrying out the agreement); (3) assume all debts and liabilities
of Needham Packing Co.; and (4) elect two Needham officers and/or directors to
the Rath-Needham board of directors. In return Needham agreed to: (1) transfer all
its assets to Rath (2) cease using its name; (3) distribute the new Rath-Needham
shares to its shareholders; (4) liquidate and dissolve the corporation; and (5) turn
over to Rath its business records and accounts. Rath v. Rath Packing Company, 136
N.W.2d 410, 412 (Iowa 1965).
2. The practical results of the plan's implementation would have been that: (1)
1,000 Needham shareholders would own approximately 54% of the newly-formed
Rath-Needham corporation; (2) the new book value of Needham's old shares would
be increased about 4 times, while the new book value of Rath's old shares would be
decreased about one-half; (3) in the event of liquidation, shares held by the old
Needham shareholders would be preferred to the old Rath shares; and (4) due to
issuance of preferred shares only to the old Needham shareholders, those shareholders
would be preferred to Rath's in dividend distribution. Ibid.
3. Iowa CoDE ANN. §§ 496A.17, -.18, -.55, -.56, -.59, -.60 (Supp. 1962). Section
496A.55 authorizes charter amendments, and §§ 496A.56, -.59, -.60 set forth the
procedure for amending the charter. Sections 496A.17, -.18 establish guide lines
for the issuance of new shares.
4. The "plan" was submitted for shareholder approval in the form of two proposals.
The first provided for amending the charter to authorize a class of 800 preferred
stock, and to increase the authorized number of common shares from 1,500,000 shares
of $10.00 par value to 3,000,000 shares of no par stock. The second proposal pro-
vided that upon acquisition by Rath of the assets, property, business and good will
of Needham, Rath would change its corporate name to Rath-Needham Corporation,
and elect Lloyd and James Needham as two of its directors. 136 N.W.2d at 412.
5. See IowA CoDE ANN. § 496A.56 (Supp. 1962). 60.1% of the company's out-
standing shares were voted in favor of the two proposals submitted. 136 N.W.2d
at 412.
6. Of the 993,185 outstanding shares of Rath Packing Co., held by about 4,000
owners, somewhat more than 6,000 were owned by these four plaintiffs. Id. at 411.
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from carrying out the plan. Plaintiffs contended that the plan
constituted a de facto merger, and hence, that those provisions
of the Iowa Code which regulate the execution of a merger7 had to
be satisfied.8 The trial court held that the proposed combination
could be accomplished under the merger sections of the Iowa Code.
In the alternative, however, it could also be accomplished solely
under the amendment sections. These two methods, said the trial
court, are legally independent and of equal dignity; compliance
with the proper sections under either scheme will produce a legal
combination. On appeal to the Supreme Court of Iowa, held,
reversed. The proposed plan so substantially affects the interests of
minority shareholders as to require compliance with the merger
sections of the Iowa statutes.' These sections are the only ones under
which a transaction of this type may be legally consumated. Rath v.
Rath Packing Co., 136 N.W.2d 410 (Iowa 1965).
At common law, corporations could combine either by the process
known as merger 0 or by one corporation selling its assets to another."
While easily distinguishable, both methods required unanimous ap-
proval of the voting shares of each of the combining corporations.
The requirement of unanimous shareholder approval for a merger or
sale of assets was gradually reduced until most modem statutes
require approval of only two-thirds of the outstanding shares. To
compensate for this reduction, however, such statutes require that
certain minority protection be granted, 2 including appraisal rights.
3
7. IOWA CODE ANte. §§ 496A.74, -.68, -.70, -.71, -.73 (Supp. 1962). Section 496A.74
authorizes mergers; § 496A.70 permits every outstanding share to be voted, whether or
not such share has voting rights under the articles of incorporation, and requires an
affirmative vote of 73 of the corporation's outstanding shares to approve a merger; §
496A.77 authorizes appraisal rights for mergers and sales of all or substantially all of
a corporation's assets.
8. Plaintiffs contended that since this was a de facto merger, they could only
receive their legislatively intended minority rights if the "plan" were accomplished
under the merger provisions of the Iowa Code. 136 N.W.2d at 413. "Section 496A.77
does not give such a right of dissent [as is provided in merger or consolidation] ...
in event of adoption of an amendment of any kind, no matter how far-reaching or
fundamental." Iow.A CODE ANN. § 496A.55 (Supp. 1962). See note 13 infra.
9. The court did not expressly find the transaction to be a de facto merger; it
said ". . [T]his agreement provides for what amounts to a merger of Rath and
Needham ... calling it a Plan and Agreement of Reorganization does not change its
essential character." 136 N.W.2d at 415. (Emphasis added.) The court later cites with
approval a statement from 15 FLErrcnm, CYCLOPEDa OF COm'ORAnONS § 7165.5
(1961), "[T]he courts treat the transaction as a de facto merger or consolidation so as
to confer upon dissenting stockholders the right to receive cash payment for their
shares." Id. at 417.
10. A merger consisted of a combination of two corporations, usually into a new
one, with a resulting dissolution of the combining corporations.
11. A sale of assets was an outright purchase of one corporation's assets by another,
resulting in dissolution and distribution of the seller corporation.
12. Such rights, referred to as "minority protections" in this comment, include the
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On the other hand, at common law an amendment of the articles of
incorporation was used only to effect internal changes in corporate
form. It was an act clearly distinct from merger or sale of assets,
and, as under most modern statutes, required only a majority vote
for its approval. Thus, the attractiveness of the more easily approved
amendment procedure was enhanced by the desire of corporations
to avoid the drainage of capital which results from the satisfaction
of appraisal demands. It was largely this combination of considera-
tions that led to the utilization of hybrid procedures to effect corpo-
rate combinations. These hybrid procedures were composed of
selected portions of the statutory amendment and merger provisions
of the governing statutes, and were so designed as not to require the
incidence of minority rights. If the participating corporations termed
the transaction a "merger," minority rights were automatically
required by the merger statutes. Many states, however, have recog-
nized that the hybrid means of combination (those not termed as
mergers by the parties) can also effect such fundamental changes
in corporate structure that minority shareholder protections should
be extended to various non-merger forms of combination. As a result,
althought the ABA Model Business Corporations Act does not
require that dissenters to charter amendments be granted minority
rights,14 such rights are available for specific types of amendments
requirement of a two-thirds vote in favor of merger proposals; allowance of class
voting on amendments which affect that class of shares; allowance of shares to vote
which are not otherwise entitled to do so, and/or the granting of appraisal rights.
13. "Rights of appraisal enable a dissenting shareholder to withdraw from a corpora-
tion rather than continue in a venture different from the one he embarked upon, or
on terms different from those in the contract he originally accepted." N.Y. Bus. Corn'.
LAW, appendix 2, at 251 (1965). Generally, appraisal rights allow the dissenting
shareholder to be paid the fair value of his shares as of the day prior to the date on
which the vote on the proposed action was taken. This date is chosen because it
tends not to reflect the market changes which occur due to an anticipated change
in the corporate structure.
14. The dissenting shareholder section of the ABA Model Business Corporation
Act provides only that:
"Any shareholder of a corporation shall have the right to dissent from any of the
following corporate actions: (a) any plan of merger or consolidation to which the
corporation is a party; or (b) any sale or exchange of all or substantially all of the
property and assets of the corporation not made in the usual and regular course of its
business, including a sale in dissolution, but not including a sale pursuant to an order
of the court having jurisdiction in the premises or a sale for cash on terms requiring
that all or substantially all of the net proceeds of sale be distributed to the shareholders
in accordance with their respective interests within one year after the date of sale. A
shareholder may dissent as to less than all of the shares registered in his name. In
that event, his rights shall be determined as if the shares as to which he has dissented
and his other shares were registered in the name of different shareholders. .. ." MODUL
Bus. Corn'. AcT § 73.
This section of the Model Act has been adopted in Alabama, Alaska, Colorado, Illinois,
Iowa, Maryland, Mississippi, Nebraska, North Dakota, Oregon, South Carolina, Texas,
Utah, Virginia, Wisconsin and Wyoming.
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under the recently enacted New York 5 and North Carolina' 6 Business
Corporations Acts. Other states, while not enumerating specific types
of amendments, allow such minority rights only in the case of
"substantial" changes by amendment.' 7 When the transaction clearly
satisfies one of the above tests, or is termed a merger by the parties,
minority rights are required by operation of the statute. Thus, the
problem of whether these rights are to be accorded shareholders
arises only when two corporations combine in such a manner that the
transaction is not clearly identified as a "merger" by the parties, does
not involve one of the, enumerated amendments, or does not clearly
satisfy the "substantial" test. When the question does arise, the
courts employ one of three methods to justify their imposition of
minority rights. 8 One such theory emphasizes the factual similarity
between the challenged transaction and the customary incidents and
definition of merger. Some courts employ this method to find the
existence of a de facto merger19 and to justify their imposition of
minority rights.20 Alternatively, some courts employ a theory which
15. New York includes among the enumerated amendments requiring dissenters
rights those which alter or abolish a shareholder's preferential redemption, or pre-
emptive rights; alter or abolish his right to vote; cause a prejudicial increase in the
priorities, dividend preferences, cumulative dividend rights, or redemption and
liquidation value of other classes of stock. N.Y. Bus. Corn'. LAw § 806(b) (6). New
York statutes, however, in line with the Model Act, no longer grant appraisal rights
where a sale of assets is for cash distribution within one year.
16. North Carolina's enumeration includes amendments which have certain specified
effects on dividends, or alter the basic nature of the corporation. This act further
requires that the notice of the shareholder meeting at which the vote is to be taken
include notice of § 55-113, including notification of the appraisal rights of a dissenter;
and it establishes an action for damages against the corporation in the event of failure
to comply with these requirements. N.C. Gmr. STAT. §§ 55-101, -108, -112, -113,
-119 (1965).
17. See e.g., TENN. CODE ANat. § 48-712 (1964). The "substantial" test, however,
does seem to reach most amendments. See, e.g., Johnson v. De Soto Hardwood
Flooring Co., 167 Tenn. 145, 67 S.W.2d 143 (1943), where it was held that an
amendment permitting the issuance of additional stock gave rise to dissenters' rights.
18. The key source of the rights sought by this type of action are the merger
statutes. These statutes generally predicate the grant of minority protection upon the
finding of the existence of a merger, either real or de facto. Thus, whether the court
construes the transaction to fit the merger definition, or construes the merger statutes
as being the only ones applicable to the particular challenged transaction under the
facts of the case, there must be an actual or implicit finding of some form of a
merger.
19. A de facto merger is a combination not denominated a merger by the parties, but
whose terms are found by the court to constitute a merger in fact. A de facto merger
must be distinguished from a true merger which is a method of combination charac-
terized as merger by the parties, and consummated under the merger sections of the
applicable corporations statutes.
20. See Metropolitan Edison Co. v. Commissioner, 98 F.2d 807 (3d Cir. 1938)
(transaction involving transfer of assets and franchises in return for assumption of
debts and return and cancellation of capital stock, accompanied by dissolution of
the seller, was a merger rather than a sale of assets); Applestein v. United Board &
Carton Corp., 60 N.J. Super. 333, 159 A.2d 146 (1960) (dissolution of the seller,
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views the problem as one of according minority shareholders their
rightful common law protections in the face of combinations which
are excessively disruptive of minority interests.21 The third group
justifies their imposition of minority rights by construing the merger
sections as being the only ones applicable under the facts of the
particular case.22 This view emphasizes statutory construction as
opposed to the factual similarity theory, which stresses an examination
of the factual situation.
After quoting with approval four definitions of merger,23 Chief
Justice Garfield held that the plan in the instant case amounted to
a de facto merger.2 The court then employed three alternative
lines of reasoning to justify its conclusion that the plan could be
consumated only under the merger provisions with their attendant
protection of minority rights. First, because a merger approved by
fewer than all of the shareholders is in derogation of the common
distribution of the purchase shares, and passage of control held to be indicative of a
de facto merger); Farris v. Glen Alden Corp., 393 Pa. 427, 143 A.2d 25 (1958)
(when transaction results in one corporation's dissolution, assumption of the seller's
liabilities by the buyer, passage of control to the survivor, and the seller's shareholders
acquiring shares in the survivor, it is a merger).
21. Farris v. Glen Alden Corp., supra note 20, suggests as an alternative to the
finding of i de facto merger that when the nature of the corporation is changed
by a combination, and plaintiff would have stock in a totally different business thrust
upon him, he has a right to dissent and be allowed out of the business. See Marx v.
Autocar, 153 F. Supp. 768 (E.D. Pa. 1954), where failure to file merger articles with
the Secretary of State and thus complete statutory procedure for a merger, which
would guarantee appraisal rights, does not preclude an action for plaintiff's appraisal
rights under common law principles. But cf., Heilbrunn v. Sun Chemical Corp., 37
Del. Ch. 552, 146 A.2d 757 (1958), aff'd, 38 Del. Ch. 321, 150 A.2d 755 (1959)
(plaintiff's failure to show injury precluded him from being granted appraisal rights).
22. See e.g., Bloch v. Baldwin Locomotive Works, 75 Pa. Dist. & Co. R. 24 (1950).
"(D)efendant has not brought himself within the terms of the statute. Therefore, the
dissenting shareholder stands helpless to protect his rights unless and until some way
is found to determine whether a merger is in fact taking place. The court of equity
has been given . . . authority . . . to determine . . . the fair value of a dissenting
shareholder's shares of stock. We see no reason, therefore, why equity should not also
have authority to determine whether or not a merger has in fact taken place, where
the statute is not followed by the corporation involved." The court then found that
the challenged transaction must give rise to appraisal rights.
23. 136 N.W.2d at 415. The court cites the following definitions: (1) "[A]
merger exists where one corporation is continued and the other is merged with it,
without the formation of a new corporation, from a sale of the property and
franchises of one corporation to another." (2) "A merger of corporations consists of
a combination whereby one of the constituent corporations remains in being-absorbing
or merging in itself all the other constituent corporations." (3) "[A] merger
signifies the absorption of one corporation by another, which retains its name and
corporate identity with the added capital, franchises and powers of a merged corpora-
tion." and "[Merger] is the uniting of two or more corporations by the transfer
of property to one of them, which continues in existence, the others being merged
therein." Ibid.
24. Supra note 9.
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law, the court concluded that the rule of strict construction requires
that legislative authority to merge be "clearly, distinctly and expressly
conferred."25 Although the merger sections of the Iowa Code ex-
pressly confer such power, the amendment sections have no such
express authorization for a combination or a merger-type transaction.
Second, the court stated that statutory provisions which specifically
treat a subject must prevail over those which treat the subject
generally. 7 The merger sections provide specifically for corporate
combinations, while the amendment sections make no such specific
reference to any form of combination. Third, the court reasoned that
the rule requiring all parts of a statute to be given effect dictates that
the amendment sections and the merger sections be interpreted to
refer to distinct types of transactions. 28 The court concluded that it
was unreasonable to ascribe to the legislature an intent to provide,
in the same statute, an alternative method of corporate combination
which permitted the evasion of the specific rights protected in the
merger sections.2 Therefore, this plan, which amounted to a de facto
merger, must comply with the procedures and safeguards set forth in
the merger sections of the Iowa Code.30
The court in this case employed the statutory construction method 3'
to justify its imposition of minority rights, rather thani employing the
de facto merger method which requires an examination of the
characterizing elements of the challenged transaction. As both
theories are ultimately founded upon the term "merger,"3 2 a grant
of minority rights is thus conditioned upon the characterization of a
transaction as a form of a merger, either real or de facto. The
utilization of such an ill-defined and ambiguous term as "merger," as
a standard to determine when minority rights should be granted,
25. 136 N.W.2d at 415.
26. The court concluded that, at best, the amendment sections might be said to
contain implied merger authority; but even this is insufficient, since nothing less than
expressed authorization will justify such a derogation of the common law. Id. at 416.
27. The court cited the following rule of construction: "[W]here one section of
a statute treats specially and solely of a matter, that section prevails in reference to
that matter over other sections in which only incidental reference is made therein.
Ibid.
28. The court reasoned that the special merger provisions are a qualification of the
general amendment provisions, and hence that merger must refer to a transaction
entirely distinct from an amendment. Ibid.
29. "The legislature could hardly have intended to vest in corporate management
the option to comply with the requirements . . . or to proceed without such
compliance." 136 N.W.2d at 417.
30. The court found it unnecessary to examine the question of the effect of a
requirement in Rath's charter that a two-thirds vote was necessary to effect a merger,
but added by way of dictum that it perhaps afforded the plaintiffs additional grounds
for relief. Id. at 418.
31. See text accompanying note 22 supra.
32. See note 16 supra.
1965 ]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
encourages hybridization of the forms of corporate combination. This
hybridization in turn creates a potential for the denial of these
rights.3 The struggle with which the courts are confronted in
attempting to justify the imposition of minority rights is indicative
of the lack of a suitable standard for determining when corporate
combinations are such as may require that the minority shareholder
be protected. In reality, the need for minority protections arises
when a proposed combination will cause an alteration of the funda-
mental intra-corporate relationships. Hence, the presence of these
potential effects-any substantial alteration of the fundamental nature
of the corporation,34 or of the shareholders' relationships with it-3
would provide a more appropriate test to determine when minority
rights should be granted. This test would provide for minority rights
whenever any proposed alteration of the corporate structure (not
necessarily only a combination) would force shareholders to engage
in a substantially different corporation or corporate venture, or to
participate on substantially different terms than those which lie
originally accepted. Against the obvious shareholder interests favor-
ing such a test must be balanced the contrary corporate interests favor-
ing maximum freedom from the constrictions on corporate activity
which are implicit in minority rights. For example, the threat of
utilization of minority rights enables small groups of shareholders to
bloat their influence in corporate control battles.36 Such a threat can
prohibit a small corporation from absorbing a larger one when an
adverse effect on the shareholders' interests is necessary as an induce-
ment for the bargain. 3 The implicit threat that minority rights may
33. Hybrid combinations may accomplish the same results as a merger, but without
the incidence of minority rights. If no aspect of the transaction requires the allowance
of minority rights, and the procedural requirements of the merger statute are not
satisfied, then the resulting hybrid combination need not be characterized as a merger
by the parties, and minority rights need not be granted. If, however, the transaction
is challenged, and the court finds some form of a de facto merger, or finds the merger
statutes to be applicable to this combination, then minority rights must be granted.
See note 20 supra.
34. The nature of the corporation refers to its function as a production or holding
company, its primary product (transportation, steel, etc.), or any of the other
essential characteristics of any given company. Changes in the basic nature would
include-in addition to changes in the above-changes in the total output of the
products of the company, both in quantity and/or variety, etc.
35. For types of shareholder interests and relationships potentially affected, see notes
15 & 16 supra.
36. The threat of demanding appraisal satisfaction with the consequent drain on
capital provides a weapon for use in forcing management to the minority shareholders'
viewpoint. Two-thirds voting requirements often result in expensive and time-con-
suming proxy battles, neither of which is beneficial to the corporation. The threat
of a proxy battle for corporate control is itself a powerful weapon for minority use.
37. The shareholder, faced on the one hand with a dilution in his interests by the
corporation, and on the other with a substantial reduction in the market value of his
shares due to anticipation of the proposed action, may find it in his best interest to
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be invoked also reduces the confidence of corporate management
in its position relative to its shareholders. Such confidence is highly
desirable if management is to bargain effectively in potential combi-
nation situations.3 Lastly, if minority rights were actually invoked,
satisfaction of appraisal demands could well remove the corporate
capital necessary to consummate the proposed transaction.3 9 The
choice, then, seems to be one of emphasizing either maximum free-
dom foi corporate activity, or the ability of the shareholder to
protest effectively, and, if still dissatisfied, to withdraw from the
corporation without financial loss. A court, faced with this choice,
is also faced with additional problems of attempting to formulate a
just solution in a particular case, and of attempting to provide
certainty in the law. The proposed standard is sufficiently flexible to
allow a just solution for both parties; yet its emphasis on the sub-
stantive effect of the proposed transaction on a shareholder provides
both parties with a standard which is relatively easy to determine.
This resulting ease of application adds certainty to the law and
predictability to shareholder-corporation relations, and permits a
degree of justice that should be satisfying to all parties concerned.
attempt to block the combination. The instant case provides an excellent example of
such market devaluation in anticipation of a combination. The plaintiff's $10 par stock
dropped to a point where it was selling for only about one-half the price of Needham,
the corporation to be absorbed.
38. The ability to bargain with full confidence is of the utmost importance in obtain-
ing a favorable bargain. If the directors must fear minorities within their own corpora-
tion, the strength of their bargaining position must be materially reduced, as they
can no longer make and receive offers, and the like, with the necessary freedom of action
and definiteness of position.
39. Many corporations which are forced by inadequate capital reserves to seek a
merger, are manifestly unable to settle substantial appraisal demands without sustain-
ing a critical drain of capital. Such a drain may be sufficient to prohibit the combina-
tion or may remove the capital necessary to make the combination advantageous.
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Criminal Law-Search and Seizure-Standing
Granted for Dyer Act Prosecutions Without
Allegation of Possession
Defendant was convicted in Wyoming of knowingly transporting
a stolen vehicle across state lines, in violation of the Dyer Act.'
The automobile had been searched by the FBI without a warrant,
and the information obtained was used to determine that the car
was stolen. Prior to trial, the federal district court denied defendant's
motion to suppress evidence obtained by an unauthorized search in
violation of the fourth amendment.2 The Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit reversed. On petition for rehearing the government
alleged that defendant lacked standing to challenge the search.
Held, a prosecution for a Dyer Act violation is one for possession,
and as such gives standing to invoke the fourth amendment. Simpson
v. United States, 346 F.2d 291 (10th Cir.), rehearing denied, 346
F.2d 295 (1965).
The federal protection against illegal search and seizure is a
personal right, protecting only those with the proper interest.3 Such
interest or standing is necessary to challenge the admissibility of
illegally obtained evidence. Standing traditionally requires a pos-
sessory interest in the searched premises, or ownership or possession
of the thing seized.4 In the past, certain "crimes of possession," such
as the possession of contraband, presented a dilemma to the accused
under this rule; for to assert possession and obtain standing meant
confessing guilt, while denial of possession resulted in the admissi-
bility of evidence obtained in what may have been an unlawful
search.5 In Jones v. United States,6 the Supreme Court met this
1. "Whoever transports in interstate or foreign commerce a motor vehicle or aircraft,
knowing the same to have been stolen, shall be fined not more than $5000, or im-
prisoned not more than five years, or both." 18 U.S.C. § 2312 (1964).
2. Two searches had in fact been made, both of which the court found to be clearly
unlawful. They were without warrant and not justifiable as incident to the arrest
since the automobile was remote in location, and the federal investigation was on a
state arrest. The fruits of the unlawful searches included all of the information used
in the prosecution. There was some question as to the propriety of the arrest, but
the court did not decide the point. Simpson v. United States, 346 F.2d 291, 293-94
(10th Cir. 1965).
3. "There can be little disagreement with the basic premise ... the rights assured
by the fourth amendment are personal rights and may be invoked only by 'the person
whose rights have been invaded . . . .' Coon v. United States, 36 F.2d 164, 165
(10th Cir. 1929)." Edwards, Standing To Suppress Unreasonably Seized Evidence,
47 Nw. U.L. Rv. 471-72 (1952).
4. See United States v. Pisano, 193 F.2d 361, 365 (7th Cir. 1951) (possession of
narcotics); Coon v. United States, supra note 3 (search of non-leased premises). See
also 59 MicH. L. REv. 444 (1961).
5. See Judge Hand's famous expression of this dilemma, Connolly v. Medalie, 58
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problem squarely, forbidding the government's assertion of such
contradictory positions. There the defendant, charged with a crime
of possession, was automatically granted standing without an allega-
tion of possession.7 Subsequent decisions have applied this exception
to the standing requirement.8 It may be noted that problems of
standing are avoided in California by excluding all illegally obtained
evidence, regardless of whether it was obtained in violation of the
particular defendant's constitutional rights.9
In the instant case, the definition of "crime of possession" was
extended to include violations of the Dyer Act. In its first opinion,
the court found standing in defendant's claim of a possessory interest
in the automobile. 10 On petition for rehearing, however, the majority
found no need for defendant to claim any possessory interest, as
the nature of the prosecution conferred standing to challenge evi-
dence obtained in the searches. The court held that as in Jones, pos-
session was sufficient to convict; therefore, no allegation of a posses-
sory interest was required." The dissent correctly pointed out, how-
ever, that mere possession of a stolen car is not a Dyer Act violation;
knowingly transporting a stolen vehicle in interstate commerce consti-
tutes the crime.' 2 This argument would take the instant case out of
the Jones exception and require the defendant to have a possessory
interest in the automobile to obtain standing.
In extending Jones, the court demonstrated a desire to protect the
defendant under the fourth amendment. "Crime of possession," how-
ever, was unfortunately and inaccurately stretched to include Dyer
F.2d 629-30 (2d Cir. 1932); see generally 14 VAN. L. REV. 418 n.6 (1960) (list of
courts of appeal decisions previously applying the dilemma). But see United States
v. Dean, 50 F.2d 905 (D. Mass. 1931) (the only court refusing to permit this situation).
6. 362 U.S. 257, 263-64 (1960).
7. "The same element in this prosecution which has caused a dilemma, i.e., that
possession both convicts and confers standing, eliminates any necessity for a preliminary
showing of an interest in the premises searched or the property seized, which
ordinarily is required when standing is challenged .... " Id. at 263.
8. Henzel v. United States, 296 F.2d 650-51 (5th Cir. 1961) (possession of fraudulent
corporate records); Contreras v. United States, 291 F.2d 63, 65 (9th Cir. 1961)
(possession of marijuana); United States v. Festa, 192 F. Supp. 160, 164 (D. Mass.
1960) (possession of papers in violation of the Wagering Tax Act).
9. People v. Martin, 45 Cal. 2d 755, 290 P.2d 855 (1955). For a discussion of the
rule, see Note, 9 STAN. L. REv. 515, 535 (1957).
10. Simpson v. United States, supra note 2, at 294.
11. Id. at 295.
12. The majority held that possession was sufficient to infer guilt on the basis of
Reese v. United States, 341 F.2d 90, 92 (10th Cir. 1965). The dissent criticized this
inference as merely fixing the quantum of proof necessary to create a jury question.
Simpson v. United States, supra note 2, at 300 (dissenting opinion). It might be noted
that one case relied upon by the dissent on another issue was vacated by the Supreme
Court one month before the rehearing, but after the first opinion in the instant case.




Act violations. Unlike possession of narcotics, mere possession of a
stolen automobile will not support a conviction. Yet the exclusion of
the illegally seized evidence was the correct result. The court's
reasoning dramatically reflects the difficulties presented by an ad-
herence to the traditional possessory interpretation of standing. A
more desirable alternative would be to adopt the California pro-
cedure, making inadmissible all illegally obtained evidence regardless
of the defendant's possession.13 Under such a rule, future decisions
would not turn on a further redefinition of crimes of possession, but
would look to the real interest of the defendant in not having such
evidence admitted against him. Law enforcement officers could
no longer trade the release of one criminal able to challenge evidence
for a conviction of a third party not having a so-called possessory
interest.14 Courts could apply a clearly defined, workable standard
in contrast to the now complex and ill-defined rule of standing. Two
objections to such a change are apparent: the burden which would
be placed upon law enforcement agencies in obtaining evidence, and
the judge-made prohibition against the assertion of third-party rights.
When the increased difficulty of securing evidence is balanced against
the desirability of protecting the rights of the accused, the burden of
obtaining evidence legally does not seem unduly harsh. California
law enforcement has not been hampered by the rule.15 In recent
years, the Supreme Court has increasingly permitted third-party asser-
tion of constitutional rights where a "fundamental right"'
16 would
otherwise have been unprotected. The liberty of parents to direct the
education of their children was held properly asserted by two private
schools.'" A Caucasian successfully relied upon the invasion of four-
teenth amendment rights of a non-Caucasian to defend the breach of
a racially-restrictive covenant.18 And a doctor had standing to attack
a state contraceptive law by asserting the rights of a husband and
wife to whom he had given advice.19 Protection from unlawful search
and seizure seems no less a fundamental right than those cited above.
Courts unable to rationalize assertion of third-party rights could alter-
natively find an individual right which would give standing to chal-
lenge the admissibility of evidence. This right would be based on
the risk of conviction, i.e., a personal interest in being free from
13. See note 9 supra and accompanying text.
14. For a discussion of this point and the suggested rule change, see 59 MIcH. L.
REv. 444-46 (1961).
15. Note, supra note 9, at 537.
16. Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 257 (1952).
17. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
18. Barrows v. Jackson, supra note 16.
19. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
[(VOL. 19
1965] RECENT CASES
prosecution by illegally seized evidence.20 By either rationale, a com-
plete exclusionary rule would end the confusion surrounding "interest"
in the property seized or the premises searched and the significance
of the crime being "one of possession." The unworkable fiction of
standing would be abolished, and fourth amendment rights would
finally be accorded adequate protection.
Damages-Restitutionary Relief for Breach of Contract
Granted Under the Tucker Act to a
Government Contractor
Plaintiff, Acme Process Equipment Co., was awarded a Govern-
ment contract for the manufacture of 75 mm. recoilless rifles.'
Shortly thereafter the Goveriment cancelled the contract,2  and
Acme instituted this suit in the Court of Claims under the Tucker
Act,3 alleging an unjustifiable breach of contract.4 Rather than ask-
20. This criminal law rule would be analogous to the standing requirement of
"adversely affected interests" common in administrative law. See Administrative
Procedure Act § 10, 60 Stat. 243 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1009(a) (1964) ("any person
suffering legal wrong... or adversely affected or aggrieved"); Federal Communications
Act § 12, 72 Stat. 945 (1958), 47 U.S.C. § 402(b) (1964) ("any ...person who is
aggrieved or whose interests are adversely affected"); Federal Aviation Act § 1009,
72 Stat. 796 (1958), 49 U.S.C. § 1489 (1964) ("all persons interested in or affected
by"); DAvis, Amnma-TRTvE L-w §§ 199-209 (1951) (critique of standing require-
ments in administrative law). A defendant in a criminal prosecution would undoubtedly
be "aggrieved" by the introduction of unlawfully obtained evidence, the public
interest being adverse to that of the defendant. Such an approach would revitalize the
exclusionary rule of Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), properly giving
all defendants the right to be free from prosecution by illegally seized evidence, and
affording a logical alternative to the rule permitting assertion of fundamental third-
party rights.
1. Acme in its first venture as a defense contractor had been awarded a contract
for the production of elevating and traversing assemblies. When the Government
cancelled this contract for its own convenience, Acme sued and recovered its costs.
Acme Process Equip, Co. v. United States, 347 F.2d 538 (Ct. Cl. 1965). This com-
ment is devoted solely to the damages aspect of Acme's suit of the 75 mm. recoilless
rifle contract.
2. The Government claimed that violations of certain statutes and covenants by
Acme rendered the contract voidable. Acme Process Equip. Co. v. United States,
347 F.2d 509, 514-28 (Ct. Cl. 1965). Since Acme remained unreimbursed for the
majority of its investment in performance of the contract, cancellation had the
effect of financially crippling Acme.
3. The Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1964), provides that "the Court of Claims
shall have jurisdiction to render judgment upon any claim against the United States
founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress, or any regulation of
an executive department, or upon any express or implied contract with the United
States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort."
4. Acme alleged the Government cancelled the contract solely to enable it to escape
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ing the usual compensatory damages, which, by putting Acme in its
post-contract condition, would inadequately compensate for the large
losses it incurred prior to the wrongful cancellation, Acme sought
restitutionary relief based on its actual costs.5 The Government con-
tended that this relief was not available under the Tucker Act and
that even if it were, recovery could not exceed the value of the goods
Acme had delivered and must not exceed under any circumstances
the contract rate. Held, where the Government unjustifiably breaches
its express contract, restitutionary relief is available under the Tucker
Act, the amount of which relief is measured by the reasonable value
of the contractor's services and is not controlled by the contract
price.6 Acme Process Equipment Co. v. United States, 347 F.2d
509 (Ct. Cl. 1965).
Prior to the enactment of the Tucker Act in 1887, the doctrine of
sovereign immunity required that the federal government not be
brought into court for breach of contract without its consent.7 The
Tucker Act empowered the Court of Claims,8 inter alia, "to render
judgment on any claim against the United States founded ... upon
any express or implied contract with the United States .... -" Since
an undesirable contract for obsolete weapons without cost. The court concluded
that two reasons existed for the cancellation: obsolescence of the 75 rm. rifle and
suspicion of Acme's fraud.
5. Since projections showed that it could have reduced the large losses suffered
had it been permitted to complete the contract, Acme argued that damages placing
it in its post-contract position would not be sufficient compensation for such injuries
sustained due to the wilful breach of the Government. These losses resulted from the
heavy initial expenditures required to transform Acmes operating basis from a
civilian market to the field of Government defense procurement. Among these
expenses were those incurred for plant conversion, retooling of all plants, training of
new personnel and similar items enabling Acme to successfully modify its system
of operation.
6. The case was remanded to the trial commissioner for a determination of the
reasonable value of Acme's services.
7. For an excellent discussion of the effect that sovereign immunity has had on
the available remedies against the United States, see Note, 70 HAnv. L. Rrv. 827
(1957).
8. The Court of Claims Act of 1855, 10 Stat. 612, which established the
Court of Claims, was the first waiver of governmental immunity. For detailed
treatment of the changes made by the Tucker Act in the court's jurisdiction, see
Dooley v. United States, 182 U.S. 222, 223-24 (1901); United States v. Jones, 131
U.S. 1, 15-18 (1888); H.R. REP. No. 1077, 49th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1886).
9. 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1964). Although the statute's reference to implied contracts
has repeatedly been interpreted to encompass only contracts implied in fact and not
contracts implied in law, i.e., quasi-contracts, the Court of Claims has exercised juris-
diction in situations where a contract very similar to quasi-contract formed the basis
of the dispute. See, e.g., New York Mail & Newspaper Transp. Co. v. United States,
139 Ct. Cl. 751, 154 F. Supp. 271, cert. denied, 355 U.S. 904 (1957) (recovery on
contract for rental by government of pneumatic tubes); Hughes Transp., Inc. v.
United States, 128 Ct. Cl. 221, 121 F. Supp. 212 (1954) (recovery of freight charges
in motor vehicle contract). But see Sutton v. United States, 256 U.S. 575 (1921)
(no recovery on Government contract for dredging and excavating); Hickman v.
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the United States has thus given its consent to be sued on implied
and expressed contracts, the same remedies are available to the
plaintiff suing the Government for breach of such contracts as
would be available were the plaintiff suing an individual. 10 It is well
settled that restitution, specific performance, and damages are avail-
able as alternative remedies for breach of contract." In awarding
the remedy of damages, the court puts the party in the position it
would be if the contract had been fully performed, i.e., its post-
contract position; but restitutionary relief restores the innocent party
to his status quo ante, i.e., his pre-contract position.' 2 Although liti-
gation under the Tucker Act has resulted in restitution being granted
for the breach of implied contracts,'13 until the present case restitu-
tion has not been allowed under the act for the breach of an express
contract.14 In determining the proper measure of restitutionary relief,
a majority of courts hold that the reasonable value of the part per-
formance rendered under the contract controls recovery,15 and that
such amount is not limited by the contract rate where the breach
occurred before the plaintiff had rendered complete performance.16
United States, 135 F. Supp. 919 (W.D. La. 1955) (no recovery for contract implied
in law to pay for mineral rights). See generally Mewett, The Quasi-Contractural Lia-
bility of Governments, 13 U. ToRoNTo L.J. 56-63 (1959); Note, 49 VA. L. REV. 773,
833-51 (1963).
10. See, e.g., United States v. Standard Rice Co., 323 U.S. 106 (1944); Perry v.
United States, 294 U.S. 330, 352 (1935); In re Floyd Acceptances, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.)
666, 675 (1868).
11. That restitution is simply one remedy for breach of contract is recognized by
the courts 'as well as the legal scholars. See e.g., Southern Painting Co. v. United
States ex rel. Silver, 222 F.2d 431 (10th Cir. 1955) (recovery of reasonable value of
services performed before wrongful discharge); United States ex rel. Susi Contracting
Co. v. Zara Contracting Co., 146 F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1944) (recovery for work per-
formed in an airport construction contract with the United States); Pelletier v.
Masse, 49 R.I. 408, 143 Ad. 609 (1928) (recovery of value of materials furnished
in a construction contract). See also 5 CoaBn, CONTRACrS §§ 1102-21 (1964) [here-
inafter cited as COaBIN]; 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS §§ 1454-85 (rev. ed. 1937);
REsTATEmNT CONTRAcs §§ 347-57 (1932).
12. For commentary on this distinction, see e.g., McDonald v. Kansas City Bolt
& Nut Co., 149 Fed. 360 (8th Cir. 1906); Dooley v. Stillson, 46 R.I. 332, 128 Ad.
217 (1925); see generally 5 CORBIN, § 1102; 5 WILLISTON, op. cit. supra note 11, §
1454; RETATEWENT, CONTRACTS §§ 326, 347 (1932).
13. See, e.g., New York Mail & Newspaper Transp. Co. v. United States, supra
note 9, at 276.
14. See note 21 infra.
15. See, e.g., Chicago v. Tilley, 103 U.S. 146 (1880); Houston Lumber Supply
Co. v. Wockenfuss, 386 S.W.2d 330 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965); In re Voss' Estate, 20
Wis. 2d 238, 121 N.W.2d 744 (1963); RFSTATEMENT, CoNTRACTS § 347 (1932). For
a summary of authority, see 5 WiLaSTON, op. cit. supra note 11, § 1459, at 4077 n.6.
16. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Susi Contracting Co. v. Zara Contracting Co.,
supra note 11; Johnston v. Star Bucket Pump Co., 274 Mo. 414, 202 S.W. 1143
(1918) (recovery on construction contract for work done allowed beyond contract
price); Clark v. Mayor of New York, 4 N.Y. 339 (1850) (recovery on public works con-
tract not confined to contract rate); 5 CoaBIN § 1112, at 597 n.51, §1113, at 602
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The minority view, however, regards the contract rate as the maxi-
mum recovery, making no exception for the case where part per-
formance has been stopped short of full performance by a wilful
breach.' 7 In measuring the reasonable value of the services rendered,
the actual cost is often used by the court;18 however, a reduction of
recovery will generally be allowed if the defendant is able to prove
that the costs incurred by the plaintiff were excessive. 19
In the instant case, the court, after determining that the Govern-
ment had unjustifiably cancelled its contract, devoted its attention
to the question of Acme's claim for restitutionary relief.20 Judge
Davis pointed out that although restitution is one of the three avail-
able remedies for breach of contract, "no past contractor has success-
fully sought [under the Tucker Act] restitutionary relief for the
breach of an express contract."21 However, he reasoned that since the
Tucker Act grants the Court of Claims jurisdiction over suits on
express contracts with the United States and does not expressly pre-
clude this form of relief, there existed no jurisdictional bar to the
availability of restitutionary relief. While the Government cited
several cases in support of denying a quantum meruit recovery,22 the
court distinguished these on the grounds that in each case restitution
n.58. However, it is clear that where the plaintiff has completely performed the
contract, the contract rate controls the recovery. See, e.g., Dermott v. Jones, 69 U.S.
(2 Wall.) 1 (1864); Higgins v. Desert Braemar, 219 Cal. App. 2d 744, 33 Cal. Rptr.
527 (1963); 5 Cormn § 1110.
17. See, e.g., Keeler v. Clifford, 165 Ill. 544, 46 N.E. 248 (1897) (contract price
limiting recovery in a severable grading contract); Noyes v. Pugin, 2 Wash. 653, 27
Pac. 548 (1891) (recovery by an architect for services limited to pro rata share of
contract). For additional cases, see 5 CoannN § 1113, at 603 n.59; see generally
Palmer, The Contract Price as a Limit on Restitution for Defendant's Breach, 20
Oio St. L.J. 264 (1959).
18. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Susi Contracting Co. v. Zara Contracting Co.,
supra note 11, at 611; United States ex. rel. Arc & Gas Welder Ass'n, Inc. v. Blount,
182 F. Supp. 648 (D. Md.), aff'd sub nom. Arc & Gas Welder Ass'n Inc. v. Green
Fuel Economizer Co., 285 F.2d 863 (4th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 919
(1961); United States ex rel. Wander v. Brotherton, 106 F. Supp. 353, 354-55
(S.D.N.Y. 1952).
19. Cf. Barrett Co. v. United States, 273 U.S. 227, 235 (1927); United States v.
Behan, 110 U.S. 338, 345-46 (1884). Most cases hold that where the costs are due
to inefficiency or extravagance, they are excessive.
20. 347 F.2d at 528-38. The case is divided into two sections: (1) Cancellation
of the contract, and (2) Acme's damages. As stated in note 1 supra, this comment
deals only with the latter.
21. 347 F.2d at 529. There appears to be no authority stating that restitution can
not be granted for breach of an express contract, but only cases which in dictum
reject this form of relief after holding that there had been no breach. See note 22
infra and accompanying text.
22. Quantum meruit is used here as being synonymous with restitutionary relief
in that the amount of recovery is the reasonable value of services given. The follow-
ing cases were those cited by the Government: Lacchi Constr. Co. v. United States,
102' Ct. Cl. 324 (1944); Frazier-Davis Constr. Co. v. United States, 100 Ct. Cl.
120 (1943); Steel Products Eng'r Co. v. United States, '78 Ct. Cl. 410 (1933).
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had been considered only after the court had found that the contract
had not been breached, and their conclusions on this question were
merely dicta and not controlling.23 The court also rejected the Govern-
ment's contention that even if restitution were available, Acme
could not qualify for such relief since the contract was for the
"production and delivery of finished articles," for the breach of
which only damages may be given.24 It held that the Government
had misconceived the nature of the contract, which was in reality
a contract not only for a finished product but also for its manu-
facture, in which case restitution is available.2s Thus, the court
found no authority requiring it to deny restitutionary relief to a
contractor injured by the Government's breach of an express contract.
As to the amount of recovery, the court refused to limit it to the
value of goods Acme had delivered prior to the cancellation, i.e., the
benefit received by the Government. Judge Davis concluded
that restitution is permitted not to prevent the breaching party from
retaining an unjust enrichment but "to restore the innocent party to
its pre-contract status quo."2 6 Thus, the Government's failure to use
or receive the rifles had no effect on the decision, especially since
it was the sole wrongdoer. Finally, the court rejected the contract
rate as a limitation on recovery, finding that the best means to restore
Acme to its pre-contract status quo was to permit recovery based on
its actual costs, provided that recovery would be appropriately re-
duced if those costs were excessive.27
In allowing restitutionary relief for breach of an express contract,
the Court of Claims broadened the remedies available to the govern-
ment contractor under the Tucker Act.2 The factual situation in the
23. 347 F.2d at 529 n.28.
24. 347 F.2d at 529. The Restatement makes the following comment: "If the per-
formance required was the production and delivery of a finished article, and the
defendant wrongfully prevents completion and delivery of the article, the plaintiff
cannot get judgment for the reasonable value of his work and labor in preparation
to perform. .. . Such work is not in itself requested or received by the defendant."
REsTATEm T, CoNrRAcTs § 347, comment c (1932).
25. 347 F.2d at 529-30. The court emphasized that Acme is to "furnish and
deliver" the rifles and that therefore the Government had in effect requested the labor
and services required to produce the product.
26. 347 F.2d at 530. See 5 Corbin § 1112; RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS. § 347, com-
ment a (1932). However, when the plaintiff is in default, it is clear that recovery is
limited to the unjust enrichment of the defendant. See Schwasnick v. Blandin, 65 F.2d
354 (2d Cir, 1933).
27. 347 F.2d at 530; see note 19 supra.
28. Although the line of reasoning followed by the court in permitting recovery
was direct and logical, it provided no hint as to the policy underlying the refusal to
allow this equitable relief to previous plaintiffs. Such reluctance seems to have -been
based on the traditional view that the Tucker Act granted jurisdiction only for those
actions "not sounding in tort"; therefore, no quasi-contractural recovery could be ob-
tained by waiving a tort claim and suing in contract for restitution. See Schillinger
1965]
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instant case, that is, the heavy losses which could have been substan-
tially lowered had the defendant permitted the completion of the
contract,29 vividly demonstrated the need for restitutionary relief which
would restore the injured party to his pre-contract position; it granted
the court an opportunity to establish, on a firm basis, the remedy of
restitutionary recovery for breach of express contracts. This exten-
sion is sound and well supported. One may speculate that in the
future the court will similarly permit recovery of reliance damages,
which are awarded as compensation for injuries caused by a plaintiff's
reliance on a breaching party's promise.30 Such damages are not
inconsistent with restitutionary relief and should logically be permit-
ted under the rationale used by the court in the instant case. Un-
doubtedly, where a plaintiff comes into court in good faith having
been severely injured by the wrongful action of the Government, such
relief should be available to him.
Federal Employers' Liability Act-Applicability of "In
Whole or in Part" Rule of Proximate Cause to
Employer's Efforts To Prove Contributory Negligence
Plaintiff brought suit under the Federal Employers' Liability Act'
in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas to
recover for injuries sustained while performing his duties as an
employee of the defendant railroad.2 Under the FELA, the burden
was on the plaintiff to prove that the railroad's negligence contributed
v. United States, 155 U.S. 163 (1894). These cases involving "waiver of tort"
were not parallel to cases such as the instant one. However, the court permitted
restitution as a remedy only after the Supreme Court held that the phrase "not
sounding in tort" referred solely to the last class of cases mentioned in the act,
i.e., claims for liquidated or unliquidated damages, and not to contract situations. See
Dooley v. United States, supra note 8; see generally Tretter, Quasi-Contractural Re-
covery Against the Government, 42 CoNEr.,L L.Q. 278 (1957). Thereafter, although
the court established restitutionary relief for breach of implied contracts, see Now
York Mail & Newspaper Transp. Co. v. United States, supra note 9, until the instant
case it refused to permit such relief in express contract situations.
29. This conclusion was based on projections made by Acme itself. 347 F.2d at 528.
30. Compare Security Stove & Mfg. Co. v. American By. Express Co., 227 Mo. App.
175, 51 S.W.2d 572 (1932) (recovery of reliance damages), with Johnston v. Star
Bucket Pump Co., supra note 16 (recovery in quantum meruit). For an excellent dis-
cussion of the applicability of the reliance interest, see Fuller & Perdue, Reliance
Interest in Contract Damages, 46 YALE L.J. 52 (1936).
1. 35 Stat. 65 (1908), as amended, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1964).
2. He was repairing a broken cable on an overhead door in the defendant's ware-
house when the door kicked backwards and knocked him off the ladder.
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"in whole or in part" to his injury.3 When the defendant railroad
sought to mitigate damages by proving contributory negligence, it was
also given the benefit of the "in whole or in part" rule for purposes
of proving such negligence.4 On appeal to the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, held, the FELA provides for a single
standard of causation which gives both plaintiff and defendant the
benefit of the "in whole or in part" rule in showing proximate cause.5
Page v. St. Louis Southwestern Ry., 349 F.2d 820 (5th Cir. 1965).
The Federal Employers' Liability Act, enacted in 1908, gives the
railroad employee6 a cause of action against his employer based on a
system of comparative negligence.7 Designed as a response to the
substantial risks inherent in railroad work, the act attempts to
distribute the expense of human injury equitably between the in-
jured employee and the railroad.8 Although a cause of action under
the FELA retains many features of a common law negligence action,9
the common law defenses have been either greatly modified or
abolished by the comparative negligence system, which diminishes
plaintiff's recoverable damages in proportion to the amount of negli-
3. Under the FELA the common law definitions of proximate cause have been
altered, and a railroad is liable in damages for injuries resulting "in whole or in part
from the negligence of any of the officers, agents, or employees of such carrier, or by
reason of any defect or insufficiency, due to its negligence, in its cars, engines, appli-
ances, machinery, track, roadbed, works, boats, wharves or other equipment." 35 Stat.
65 (1908), as amended, 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1964). (Emphasis added.)
4. Plaintiffs contended that Congress had intended for the employer-defendants
to be restricted to the common law definitions of proximate cause in their efforts to
prove contributory negligence. At common law proximate cause had no exact defini-
tion, but included a mixture of such concepts as natural and probable consequences,
foreseeability of harm, the "but for" rule, and the substantial factor test. For a
discussion of these concepts, see PRossEn, TORTS §§ 41, 49 & 50 (3d ed. 1964).
5. The case was reversed and remanded on grounds relating to the admissibility of
evidence.
6. The 1908 Act applied only to railroad workers, but in 1920 its provisions were
extended to seamen. 41 Stat. 1007 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1964).
7. "That in all actions hereafter brought against any such common carrier by railroad
...to recover damages for personal injuries to an employee, or where such injuries
have resulted in his death, the fact that the employee may have been guilty of
contributory negligence shall not bar a recovery, but the damages shall be diminished
by the jury in proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to such employee:
Provided, That no such employee who may be injured or killed shall be held to have
been guilty of contributory negligence in any case where the violation by such
common carrier of any statute enacted for the safety of employees contributed to
the injury or death of such employee." 35 Stat. 66 (1908), as amended, 45 U.S.C. §
53 (1964).
8. See Sinkler v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 356 U.S. 326, 329 (1958); see generally
Griffith, The Vindication of a National Public Policy Under the Federal Employers"
Liability Act, 18 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 160 (1953). State courts have concurrent
jurisdiction with the federal courts in these actions. 36 Stat. 291 (1910), as amended,
45 U.S.C. § 56 (1964).
9. This is in contrast to cases under the various workmen's compensation statutes, in
which an injured employee need not prove negligence or a causal relationship between
the negligence and the injury. See Note, 49 CORNELL L.Q. 542 (1964).
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gence attributable to him.10 As he is thus unable to interpose con-
tributory negligence as a complete bar, the employer has a complete
defense only when he is able to show that the negligence of the
injured employee" or the negligence of a third party12 was the sole
proximate cause of the injury.13
Initially, the'courts were very reluctant to deviate from common
law rules in FELA cases, but the progression of decisions reflects a
recognition on the part of the courts that the special features of the
FELA action make it significantly different from a common law
action for negligence. The United States Supreme Court14 had little
difficulty in defining negligence under the FELA in terms of the
common law standard of "lack of due care under the circumstances;""
however, the definition of proximate cause has been more troublesome.
In Brady v. Southern Ry.,16 the Court adopted a common law defini-
tion of proximate cause for FELA cases when it declared that, "it
must appear that the injury was the natural and probable consequence
of the negligence or wrongful conduct and that it ought to have been
foreseen in the light of the attending circumstances." 17 In the decade
following this decision, however, there developed a trend to liberalize
the requirement of causal connection. 8 Finally, in Rogers v. Missouri
Pacific R.R.,19 the Supreme Court admitted that it was not applying
common law standards in FELA cases and held that for the purpose
of finding negligence on the part of an employer, the test of proximate
cause is whether "employer negligence played any part, even the
slightest, in producing the injury or death for which damages are
sought."20 This rule obviously makes it easier for the injured employee
10. See note 7 supra. The fellow servant doctrine has been abolished as a defense in
that the negligence of a co-employee is imputed to the employer. Chesapeake & 0.
Ry. v. De Atley, 241 U.S. 310 (1916). Although the defense of assumption of risk
was available initially, the 1939 amendments abolished it. 53 Stat. 1404 (1939), 45
U.S.C. § 54 (1964); see Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 318 U.S. 54 (1943).
- 11. Chicago, St.P., M. & O.R.R. v. Arnold, 160 F.2d 1002 (8th Cir. 1947); Lovejoy v.
Monongahela Connecting R.R., 137 F. Supp. 42 (W.D. Pa. 1955); Crowder v. Atchison,
T. & S.F. Ry., 117 Cal. App. 2d 568, 256 P.2d 85 (1953).
12. 'Rhinelander v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 257 S.W.2d 655 (Mo. 1953).
13. In the instant case the verdict was for the defendant. Apparently, the jury
found that the railroad was in no way responsible for plaintiff's injuries, and that
plaintiff's own negligence was the sole proximate cause of his injuries.
14. The determination of what constitutes negligence under the FELA is a federal
question. Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 172 (1949); Ellis v. Union Pac. R.R.,
329 U.S. 649 (1947); Bailey v. Central Vt. Ry., 319 U.S. 350 (1943). Hence the
rule of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), has no application.
15. Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., supra note 10, at 67.
16. 320 U.S. 476 (1943).
17. Id. at 483, quoting Milwaukee & St.P. Ry. v. Kellogg, 94 U.S. 469, 475 (1877).
18. See DeParcq, A Decade of Progress Under the Federal Employers" Liability Act,
18 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROB. 257, 271 (1953).
19. 352 U.S. 500 (1957).
20. Id. at 506. In Gallick v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 372 U.S. 108 (1963), Mr. Justico
[ VOL. 19
RECENT CASES
to prove proximate cause with respect to the employer's negligence.
In recent litigation, employers have sought the benefit of this "in
whole or in part" causation concept in their efforts to prove contribu-
tory negligence. In Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R. v. Shelton,2 the Texas
Court of Civil Appeals held that, in the absence of clear statutory
language giving the employer the benefit of the new rule, the common
law concept of proximate cause must prevail. In Ganoti v. New York
Central R.R., 22 however, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held for
the railroad saying that, if the Congress had intended to make a
distinction between proximate cause for purposes of proving the
railroad's negligence and proximate cause for purposes of proving
the employee's contributory negligence, express words to that effect
would have been used.
In the instant case, after carefully distinguishing negligence from
causation, the court noted that "ordinary prudence" is the standard
of care for both the employee and the railroad, and outlined three
reasons why there should likewise be a single standard of causation.
First, the court doubted that a differentiation between types of proxi-
mate cause would have any practical effect on the jury since it is
doubtful that the jurors would understand the judge's distinctions. 23
Secondly, the court advanced the theory that the overriding congres-
sional objective was improved safety in general, rather than simply the
elevation of the railroad's operational standard of care.2 It concluded
that a common application of the new rule of causation would impose
on both employer and employee a higher standard of performance ancd
thus would be consistent with the congressional hope of improved
safety.25 Thirdly, the court suggested that a comparative negliger~ce
system, by its very nature, requires that there be a single standard
of causation. The abolition of contributory negligence as a complete
bar to recovery necessarily implied a rejection of the common law
definitions of proximate cause26 in favor of a simplified structure in
which damages would be shared by the railroad and the injured
White quoted the above passage and deleted the phrase "even the slightest." Id. -at
116. Perhaps the Gallick Court felt that the Rogers Court had extended the "in
whole or in part" concept too far. At any rate, it appears that "in part" is not to
be translated as "in the slightest."
21. 383 S.W.2d 842 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964).
22. 342 F.2d 767 (6th Cir. 1965).
23. Page v. St. Louis S.W. Ry., 349 F.2d 820, 824 (5th Cir. 1965).
24. Plaintiff insisted that to allow the railroad greater ease in shifting part of its
economic loss to the injured employee would tend to make the railroad less diligent
in its operating practices.
25. Page v. St. Louis S.W. Ry., supra note 23, at 824.
26. Apparently, the court is saying that, unless there are express words to the con-
trary, it will be assumed by virtue of the comparative negligence arrangement that it
was the congressional purpose to circumvent the traditional refinements incident to
the common law concept of contributory negligence.
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employee in proportion to their respective faults. Referring to this
new arrangement as a system of comparative fault, the court con-
eluded that, if it is to work, "the basis of comparison has to be the
same."
2 7
The principal objective of the FELA was to alleviate the plight of
the injured railroad employee by shifting a large portion of his loss
to the railroad. To some extent this objective is frustrated by allow-
ing the employer the benefit of the "in whole or in part" rule of
causation for it is obviously easier for a jury to find contributory
negligence under this rule. On the other hand, the ability of the
comparative negligence system to achieve an equitable result would
be hampered if the railroads are forced to operate under anything
other than the "in whole or in part" rule. The FELA system of
comparative negligence was conceived for the purpose of distributing
the loss equitably between the parties in relation to the extent that
their respective acts of negligence were contributing factors. It is
difficult to see how any equitable distribution can be made if the
basis for comparison is different. An absolute application of the
single standard in this comparison and distribution process might
in certain situations work injustice on the injured employee; how-
ever, there will not be an absolute application because Congress
has provided that there should be no inquiry into contributory negli-
gence, and thus no reduction of damages, where the railroad's
negligence consists of a violation of a safety-appliance statute.
28
With the removal of cases involving safety violations from the com-
parative negligence structure, the possibility of harm to the injured
employee by a common application of the "in whole or in part" rule
in the comparison process is greatly reduced. Thus, although the
injured employee will be made to suffer to some extent by applying
the single standard of causation, the equitable features of the FELA
comparative negligence system will be considerably altered if the
single standard is not applied. On balance, the possibility of detri-
ment to an employee appears to be outweighed by the inherent need
within the comparative negligence system for a comparison of the
negligent parties on an equal basis.
27. Page v. St. Louis S.W. Ry., supra note 23, at 824.
28. Coray v. Southern Pac. Co., 335 U.S. 520 (1948); see note 7 supra.
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Insurance-Reinsured Stock Insurance Company Not
Liable for Assessments as Member of Reinsuring
Mutual Insurance Company
A Wisconsin mutual insurance company' entered into reinsurance
treaties2 with defendant, a foreign stock insurance company,3 to
reinsure the liability of defendant on certain school accident policies.
When the mutual was determined to be insolvent, plaintiff, Wisconsin's
Commissioner of Insurance, was directed to liquidate the mutual
company's assets pursuant to statute.4 Subsequently, the defendant,
Peerless Insurance Company, was assessed on the grounds that its
reinsurance treaty with the mutual was an insurance "policy'5 which
established the defendant as a member of the mutual and liable for
assessment under Wisconsin statutes.6 The trial court entered judg-
ment holding defendant liable for assessment. On appeal to the
Supreme Court of Wisconsin, held, reversed. A foreign stock insurance
company which reinsures a portion of its risk with a domestic mutual
insurance company does not thereby become a policyholder-member
of the mutual so as to be liable for assessment. Peerless Insurance Co.
v. Manson, 27 Wis. 2d 601, 135 N.W.2d 258 (1965).
Most states, including Wisconsin, have enacted statutes regulating
those mutual companies not limited to a particular locality. Statutes
in twenty-five states specifically provide that a reinsured company is
1. A mutual insurance company is "one in which the members are both the insurers
and the insured . . .whereas the purpose of a stock insurance company is primarily
to earn money for the stockholders." 18 APPLEMAN, INsURANcE 79-80 (1945).
2. Reinsurance has been defined as "a contract whereby one for a consideration
agrees to indemnify another wholly or partially against loss or liability by reason of
a risk the latter has assumed under a separate and distinct contract as insurer of a
third party." Stickel v. Excess Ins. Co. of America, 136 Ohio St. 49, 23 N.E.2d 839
(1939). "A 'reinsurance treaty' is an agreement between two insurance companies
where one agrees to cede and the other to accept reinsurance business pursuant to
the provisions specified in the treaty." 13 APPLEMAN, INSTRANCE 435 (1945).
3. "A stock insurance company is one in which the stockholders, who need not be
policyholders, contribute all the capital, pay all losses, and take the profits." 18
APPLEMAN, INsuRANcE 2 (1945).
4. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 200.08 (1961).
5. Plaintiff contended that reinsurance fell within the Wisconsin court's definition
of insurance as a "contract whereby one party agrees to wholly or partially indemnify
another for loss or damage .... ." Shakman v. United States Credit System Co.,
92 Wis. 366, 374, 66 N.W. 528, 531 (1896), approved, Sims v. Manson, 25 Wis. 2d
110, 114, 130 N.W.2d 200, 202 (1964). Plaintiff then argued that since reinsurance
and insurance were in essence the same, the holder of a reinsurance treaty was the
holder of an insurance "policy."
6. Plaintiff relied on Wis. STAT. ANN. § 201.02(3)(d), which provides that articles
of incorporation of a mutual company shall contain "the condition of membership which
shall provide that each policyholder have one vote and shall be liable for a pro rata
share of losses and expenses incurred during the time the policyholder has been a mem-
ber of the company, unless the liabilityof all members is limited according to law."
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not a member of the mutual that reinsures it.7 The problem of the
instant case can arise only in those states whose legislatures have not
specifically resolved the question. There the decision must be reached
by interpreting statutes generally authorizing and regulating mutuals.
This typically entails a determination of whether a reinsurance treaty
i's an insurance "policy" within the meaning of the relevant statute,
for if the term "policy" includes reinsurance treaties, the reinsured is
a policyholder-member of the mutual and thus liable for assessment.
Although no reported cases have dealt with this exact factual situa-
tion, several cases have considered whether a reinsurance contract is
an insurance "policy." In Cunningham v. Republic Insurance Co.,8 the
court refused to allow insurance companies having reinsurance con-
tracts with an insolvent insurance company to share in the proceeds
from qualification bonds since the reinsured companies were not
"policyholders" of the insolvent company. The court noted that
"reinsurance contracts are not policies of insurance. Neither are they
contracts of insurance, as that term is generally understood."' A
Virginia court concluded that reinsurance contracts might technically
be regarded as "policies," but that practically speaking "policy" usually
suggested a contract of insurance for protection of a property owner
against loss and would not include contracts of reinsurance?'° In
Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. International Re-insurance Corp.,"
the court noted several practical and technical differences between
insurance and reinsurance,12 but concluded that the problem of
- 7. ARuz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 20-715 (1956); ARx. STAT. ANN. § 66-4216 (1947);
CAL. INS. CODE § 4013; FLA. STAT. § 628-301 (1961); GA. CODE ANN. § 56-1516
(1960); I-AwAi REv. LAws § 181-178 (1955); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 41-2829 (1948);
JILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, § 671 (1963); Ky. REv. STAT. § 304.171 (1963); MD. ANN.
CODE art. 48A, § 257 (1957); MASS. G N. LAws ANN. ch. 175, § 20 (1959); Mxcix.
STAT. ANN. § 24-1632 (1957); MoNT. REV. CODES ANN. § 40-4714 (1947); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 58-18-19 (1953); OxLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 2115 (1958); OnE. REV. STAT.
§ 739.165 (1953); P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 26, § 2909 (1958); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. §
27-5-13 (1956); S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-372 (1962); S.D. CODE § 31.2916 (1939);
TEx. INS. CODE ANN. art. 15.17 (1963), UTAH CODE ANN. § 31-9-11 (1953); VA. CODE
ANN. § 38-1-26 (1950); WASH. REv. CODE § 48.09.110 (1964); W. VA. CODE ANN.
-§ 3352 (1961). The wording of the statutes is rather uniform. A typical statute will
provide that each policyholder of a domestic mutual insurer, other than a holder
of a reinsurance contract, is a member of the mutual.
8. 127 Tex. 499; 94 S.W.2d 140 (1936).
9. Id. at 504, 94 S:W.2d at 142, approved, Stradley v. Southwestern Life Ins. Co.,
341 S.W.2d 195, 198 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960).
10. Shepherd v. Virginia State Ins. Co., 120 Va. 383, 91 S.E. 140 (1917). Insurance
companies reinsured by a subsequently insolvent Pennsylvania insurance company
were found not to be "policyholders" and were thus unable to share ratably in the
proceeds of bonds deposited under Virginia law for the protection of "policyholders."
11. 117 N.J. Eq. 190, 175 Atl. 114 (1934).
12. "First, one is a contract of direct, original insurance, insuring the original
applicant; the, other is a contract, of re-insurance, insuring the insurer of the original
applicant and indirectly, insuring the latter. Second, the contract of insurance may
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whether holders of reinsurance contracts were policyholders was
purely one of statutory interpretation. In that case the court decided
that "policyholders" did not include parties to a reinsurance contract.'3
The New York case of Skaneateles Paper Co. v. American Under-
writers Fire Insurance Co.,14 offers perhaps the strongest support for
the view that a reinsurance treaty is in essence an insurance policy.
In dictum, the court specifically indicated that an insurance company
reinsured by a mutual would become thereby a member of the mutual
liable for assessment.15 The Skaneateles decision is not the pievailing
view; the case law offers more support for limiting the definition of"policy" by excluding reinsurance agreements. 6  It is apparent that
each case must turn on an interpretation of the particular state statute
involved.
The Wisconsin court faced the task of distinguishing a recently
decided case, Pella Farm Mutual Insurance Co. v. Hartland Richmond
or may not be a contract of indemnity-the contracts of fire and life insurance are
frequently not contracts of indemnity. Third . .. the reinsurance contract (at least
from the standpoint of the company, reinsured) is a method whereby the original
insuring company takes another- company into 'partnership' on the .particular. risk."
Id. at 202, 175 Atl. at 121. The court also noted, however, that "from the standpoint
of the reinsuring company, the contract of reinsurance is simply the issuance of another
contract of insurance . .. to it, the only difference is that the insured is another
insurance company instead of one of the general public." Ibid.
13. Cf. Maurer v. International Re-insurance Corp., 32 Del. Ch. 447, 86 A.2d 360
(1952), in which the coint stated that while "policyholder" did not necessarily
include holders of reinsurance contracts, it did so :in the present case. Thus plaintiff
insurance companies having reinsurance contracts with insolvent company were en-
titled to participate in proceeds of deposit made in trust for benefit of policyholders.
14. 61 Misc. 457, 114 N.Y. Supp. 200 (Sup. Ct. 1908).
15. This was not the exact holding of the court,, however. The court decided that
the subject matter of a reinsurance contract was "insured 'property" within the
meaning of a state statute concerning the expansion of local mutuals. Such local
mutuals were limited to operation in-certain counties, and expansion into other counties
was allowed only if the value of the mutuals insured property exceeded a certain
sum. The court then said in a dictum that since the subject matter was "insured
property," it would follow that "the company obtaining such reinsurance would
become thereby a member of the indemnifying co-operative company and subject to
pro rata liability for assessments during the life of the contract as other members
because .. .the assessments must be laid 'upon all the property at that time insured.'"
Id. at 461-62, 114 N.Y. Supp. at 204. But see Allison v. Fidelity Mut. Fire Ins. Co.,
81 Neb. 494, 116 N.W. 274 (1908), in which the court decided that a local mutual
which reinsured part of its risk with another local mutual was not lable fR- Assoss-
ments as a member of the reinsuring company because the.-act of reinsuring was
ultra vires where not specifically granted by statute to such local mutuals. The court s
holding depended on a decision that by authorizing local mutuals to insure the property
of its members, the legislature had not intended that such mutuals have the rig.ht to
reinsure. This implies that the subject matter of a' reinsurance contract is not
"insured property" within the meaning of the particular Nebraska statue.
16. No other reported case has dealt with the exact problem decided by the
Wisconsin court. It should be noted that of the cases cited above, only Skaneateles
and Allison are concerned with assessment situations. Since these two cases both
involved local mutual companies, which usually receive special treatment from state
legislatures, the instant case is essentially one of first impression in this country.
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Town Insurance Co.,17 which held that a town mutual which rein-
sured part of its risk with another town mutual became a member
thereof and liable for assessment.18 The court concluded that the
Wisconsin laws governing town mutuals19 were separate and distinct
from those concerning insurers in general, 20 and that the court's
interpretation of chapter 20221 in Pella did not govern its interpreta-
tion of chapter 20122 in the instant case. The court rejected the
argument that the statutory definition of "policy" as "every kind and
form of contract of insurance" 3 included a reinsurance treaty, and
that the reinsured was thus a policyholder-member of the reinsuring
mutual. Such rejection was supported by noting that the state laws
did not expressly equate a reinsurance treaty with an insurance
contract, that the laws did not identify reinsurance with insurance,
and that they did not specifically subject the reinsured company to
membership in the reinsuring mutual. The allusion to "reinsurance"
in at least thirteen sections in one chapter of the state statutes 4 indi-
cated to the court that the legislature had not intended that rein-
surance and insurance be treated identically. The court noted that
Peerless was not treated as a member of the mutual since it had
received no statements, dividends,21 or notices of any kind from the
mutual, nor had it ever cast a vote.26 The court refused to base its
holding on such practical differences between insurance policies and
reinsurance treaties, however, and decided only that since reinsurance
and insurance were treated separately under Wisconsin law the legis-
lature did not intend that a stock insurance company become a
policyholder of the reinsuring mutual and thus an assessable member.
The court's decision is in harmony with the twenty-five states which
have resolved the question by statute. In states having no statutes
17. 26 Wis. 2d 29, 132 N.W.2d 225 (1965).
18. Pella and Hartland, both town mutuals, executed a reinsurance agreement;
Pella became insolvent and sued Hartland for an assessment. The county court con-
cluded that Hartland was not liable for an assessment as a matter of law. On
appeal to the Wisconsin Supreme Court, held, reversed. "[A] construction that the
reinsureds are members and subject to assessment is more consonant with the statutory
pattern of unlimited mutuality which was fundamental to the town mutuals as originally
organized." Id. at 40, 132 N.W.2d at 230.
19. Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 202.01-.20 (1961).
20. Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 201.01-.83 (1961). Peerless supported this contention by
citing thirteen sections of the Wisconsin statutes dealing with insurance companies in
which the legislature specifically alluded to reinsurance. 27 Wis. 2d 601, 135 N.W.2d
258, 260 n.14 (1965).
21. Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 202-01-.20 (1961).
22. Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 201.01-.83 (1961).
23. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 201.01(3) (1961).
24. See note 20 supra.
25. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 201.135 (1961), which authorized payment of dividends
at the discretion of the board of directors of the mutual.
26. See the Wisconsin statute cited note 6 supra.
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specifically governing the problem, statutes generally regulating
mutuals must provide the basis for decision, but such general statutes
furnish little assistance in resolving the precise issue raised in the
instant case.27 The practical differences between a reinsurance treaty
and an insurance policy offer more substantial support for the decision
reached by the Wisconsin Court. Under the treaty, Peerless was not
represented at meetings and received no proxy authorizations, state-
ments or notices of any kind from the mutual. Since these rights
of ordinary policyholders were denied the reinsured, it is logical to
conclude that Peerless was not the holder of an insurance "policy"
issued by a mutual company.2 Public policy also seems to support
the decision of the Wisconsin court. If a decision contrary to that of
the principal case were adopted, the reinsured might be unwilling to
enter into a treaty which would expose it to contingent assessment
liability, particularly where reinsurance treaties with stock insurance
companies were available. The voting rights of the reinsured would
also raise significant problems. If the reinsured were held to be a
member of the mutual, it would have the right to participate in
management.29 If one vote is allowed for each policy reinsured under
a treaty, the degree of control of the mutual relinquished to the
reinsured would deter the mutual from engaging in such treaties. On
the other hand, if the reinsured is allowed to only one vote regardless
of the number of policies involved and their dollar amounts, the
reinsured would find no corresponding advantage to justify its ex-
posure to the large contingent assessment liability. Thus, a decision
contrary to that reached by the Wisconsin court would pose significant
barriers to a mutuars accessibility to reinsurance. Finally, it is possible
that such a decision would result in an assessment which would lead
to the insolvency of a small reinsured company.30 The Wisconsin
court relied primarily on statutory interpretation to justify its decision,
and it is unfortunate that the practical and policy considerations
supporting the holding were not more strongly emphasized. As
long as there are states whose statutes do not specifically resolve
the question, it is possible, though unlikely, that a court will adopt
a rule contrary to that of the instant case. Such a decision could
27. See, e.g., Pella Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hartland Richmond Town Ins. Co., supra
note 17, at 34, 35, 132 N.W.2d at 225, 227, where the" court recognized that the
wording of the particular statutes involved might be interpreted as either supporting
or not supporting assessment of the reinsured company.
28. For the general differences between insurance and reinsurance urged by Peerless,
see 27 Wis. 2d at 60, 135 N.W.2d at 260-61.
29. See the Wisconsin statute cited note 6 supra.
30. "Adequate reinsurance facilities . . . are conceded to be of the utmost im-
portance to the stable operation of the insurance industry. Reinsurance is particularly
important for smaller or newer organizations." HENSLEY, CoM:PETITON, REGULATION
A m T Puarac INTEREST IN NONLwE INSURANCE 17 (1962).
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possibly be justified by a technical analysis of statutory language,31
but would be contrary to the practical operation of reinsurance
treaties and to public policy considerations as well. The obvious
solution is to resolve the question by statute before it arises, as
twenty-five states have already done.
Taxation-Federal Income Tax-Business Purpose
Test for Deductibility of Rental Payments in
a Trust-Leaseback Arrangement
Taxpayer and wife conveyed certain realty including the husband's
medical office building in trust1 to a local bank,2 naming their four
minor children as income beneficiaries. 3 The trust, which was ir-
revocable and to last for a period of eleven years, assured the grantors
the power to appoint a successor trustee in the event of resignation,
the power to approve and settle the accounts of the trustee,4 and the
right to receive the assets upon the termination of the trust. Tax-
payer then leased the building from the trustee for a term of eleven
years at an annual rental of 1500 dollars, and, two years later, con-
veyed5 his reversionary interest to his wife. During the three years
in question, which were subsequent to this conveyance, taxpayer
paid the trustee rent in the amount of 1500 dollars and, in his tax
returns for these years6, claimed these payments as deductions under
section 162(a)(3).? The Commissioner refused to allow the de-
31. See note 27 supra and the authorities cited therein.
1. The trust agreement specifically stated the grantors' intention to create a short-
term Clifford Trust for the benefit of the grantors' minor children and to have any
provision of the trust declared void if it violated the Clifford sections of the Code.
For a discussion of the Clifford Trust, see note 11 infra.
2. According to the terms of the trust, the trustee was to "bold, manage and pro-
tect the Trust Estate in accordance with its best judgment and discretion . . .
[with] ...every power and authority over the Trust Estate that it would have as
an individual who was the absolute owner thereof." Alden B. Oakes, 44 T.C. 524,
(1965).
3. The trust provided that in case of death of any of the minor beneficiaries the
unexpended or accumulated income would go to the deceased beneficiary's estate.
Ibid.
4. The trustee reserved the power to have its accounts settled by a court of compe-
tent jurisdiction. Ibid.
5. The consideration for the conveyance was the payment of $100 plus "other goods
and valuable considerations." Id. at 2663.
6. During the years in question, 1059, 1960, and 1961, petitioners filed a joint
income tax return.
7. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 162(a)(3): "(a) IN GENEIRAL.-There shall be
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ductions on the ground that the leaseback was merely a method of
assigning income to family members.8 On petition to the Tax Court,
held, absent elements of control reserved by the grantor-lessee, his
rental payments to a valid irrevocable trust are deductible as ordinary
and necessary business expenses, upon the showing of a post-gift busi-
ness purpose. Alden B. Oakes, 44 T.C. 524 (1965).
The family trust-leaseback consists of a transfer of property to a
trust for the benefit of the grantor's family, with the grantor then
leasing the property from the trust. The tax benefits derived from
such a transaction can be substantial if the grantor is in a high
income tax bracket and the beneficiary is in a low one.9 The validity
of intra-family shifting of income received judicial scrutiny in
Helvering v. Clifford.10 There the taxpayer declared himself trustee
of certain of his securities for five years, and appointed his wife the
beneficiary. In ignoring the trust and holding the trust income taxable
to the grantor as personal income, the Supreme Court reasoned that the
taxpayer retained control over the fund, including the right to the
reversionary interest, and, thus, for tax purposes, was the true owner.
Subsequently codified, the Clifford rules provide that rental pay-
ments to certain short-term trusts" are taxable as income to either
allowed as a deduction all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during
the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business, including-
(3) Rentals or other payments required to be made as a condition to the continued
use or possession, for purposes of the trade or business, or property to which the
taxpayer has not taken or is not taking title or in which he has no equity."
8. The deficiency notice stated: "It is held that the claimed deduction for rent
paid to a trust, created by you, for the use of the trust property under a leaseback
agreement is not allowable since the trust and leaseback agreement are merely a means
of assigning income to family members, and is not deductible under any section of the
Code."
9. See Note, 38 N.Y.U.L. REv. 740 (1963). That the leaseback arrangement in-
volves members of the same family does not by itself invalidate the deduction of
rental payments. Such a transaction does, however, receive close scrutiny by the
courts. See 4 METENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXAI-ON § 25.111 (rev. ed.
1960). When such a transaction has not utilized. a trust, the tendency has been to
disallow the deduction. See, e.g., White v. Fitzpatrick, 193 F.2d 398 (2d Cir. 1951),
cert. denied, 343 U.S. 928 (1952), wherein a husband who gave his wife patent
rights necessary for his business and a sum of money sufficient to purchase the
business property, while at the same time retaining control over both the patents
and the property, was denied deductions for royalty and rental payments. See
generally Cohen, Transfers and Leasebacks to Trusts: Tax and Planning Considera-
tions, 43 VA. L. REv. 31, 37-40 (1957).
10. 309 U.S. 331 (1940).
11. See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 671-78. The trust must comply with the
following requirements: (1) No reversionary interest in the grantor may take effect
within ten years; § 673(a) (for charities, the period is two years (§ 673(b)). (2)
The beneficial enjoyment of the corpus or the income may not be subject to a power
of disposition by the grantor without the consent of any adverse party. § 674 (a).
(3) Certain restrictions are placed on the administrative powers of the grantor. § 675.
(4) The trust must be irrevocable. § 676. (5) The trust income may not, without
the consent of any adverse party, be distributed to the grantor, held or accumulated
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the trust or the beneficiary, but not to the settlor. However, the
Clifford sections of both the Code and the regulations' 2 deal only
with the taxation of the trust income and not the deductibility of the
rental payments. Consequently, a settlor seeking the deduction of
rental payments as "business expenses" must satisfy the requirements
of section 162(a)(3) and, in addition, prove the reasonableness of
the payments.13 In determining whether the deductions are both
"ordinary and necessary" and thus for a "business purpose," the
courts, guided more by "substance" than "form,"14 have measured
the validity of the transaction by several factors. The emphasis of the
early cases was on the prearrangement, 15 which was considered indi-
cative of both sham and lack of a business purpose. On the other
hand, Skemp v. Commissioner16 and Brown v. Commissioner7 indi-
cate that prearrangement by itself will not preclude deductibility of
rental payments. A second, and far more important factor, has been
for future distribution to the grantor, or applied to the payment of premiums on
policies of insurance on the life of the grantor (with certain exceptions). § 677. (6)
The income must not be applied to pay a prior obligation of the grantor. § 678(c).
12. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.671-.678 (1956). Section 1.671-1(c) states the Treasury
position as follows: "Likewise, these sections have no application in determining the
right of a grantor to deductions for payments to a trust under a transfer and lease-
back arrangement."
13. See Kirsehenmann v. Westover, 225 F.2d 69 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 350
U.S. 834 (1955); W. H. Armston Co. v. Commissioner, 188 F.2d 531 (5th Cir. 1951),
affirming 12 T.C. 539 (1949). See generally 4 MRmENs, op. cit. supra note 9,
§ 25.111.
14. According to one writer, "Superficially the issue appears to be whether pay-
ments are "required" for the use of the property; but fundamentally the issue is
whether the requirement is sufficiently substantial to withstand the scrutiny of the
courts willing to disregard form in order to interpret the statute equitably, particularly
when transfers among related taxpayers are made with tax avoidance as the obvious
motive." Cohen, supra note 9, at 32. See Rev. Rul. 54-9, 1954-1 CuM. BUL.L. 20.
15. In Johnson v. Commissioner, 86 F.2d 710 (2d Cir.), affirming 33 B.T.A. 1003
(1936), the husband taxpayer granted a $400,000 gift to his wife, who in turn
delivered the check to a trustee. The husband, in accordance with a loan provision
in the trust, then executed a demand note to the trustee for the same amount, and
attempted to claim a deduction for the interest payments. In disallowing the deduc-
tions and holding the interest payments gratuitous, the court viewed the gift, trust,
and loan as a single transaction amounting to a sham. This same reasoning was
subsequently adopted in the leaseback cases. See, e.g., Helen C. Brown, 12 T.C.
1095 (1949), rev'd, 180 F.2d 926 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 814 (1950).
16. 168 F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1948), reversing 8 T.C. 415 (1947). There the
petitioner-physician conveyed his clinic to an independent trustee for the benefit of
his wife and children. The trust was irrevocable for a period of twenty years, unless
prior to that time both the settlor and his wife died. Upon termination, the trust
property was to be distributed to the settlor's children. On the same day that the trust
was executed, the settlor leased the propery for ten years at $500 per month. In
reversing the Tax Court, the Seventh Circuit held the rental payments deductible as
business expenses.
17. 180 F.2d 926 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 814 (1950). Rents and
royalties paid by the taxpayers to the independent trustee of two irrevocable trusts
for the benefit of the settlors' children were held deductible.
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the courts' reluctance to allow the deductions when the trustee is
not independent. In many cases in which the taxpayer has been
successful, 8 the trustee has been someone other than the settlor,
although the question of just how independent the trustee must
be has not been resolved.19 A third persuasive factor has been the
retention of the reversionary interest by the grantor. Again, in the
decisions upholding deductibility, the grantor has not retained the
reversionary interest,20 whereas in two recent cases decided against
the taxpayers, the grantors or their estates were the designated re-
maindermen.2 1 In the same two decisions, the trusts were revocable
after a ten year period. Also, certain casesz2 have disallowed the
deductions on the ground that the taxpayer retained an equity in
the trust property. This theory, based upon a literal reading of sec-
tion 162(a) (3), has been criticized,z and has not been widely uti-
lized.24 As a general rule, the courts, prior to the decision in Van
Zandt v. Commissioner, tended to measure the validity of the busi-
ness purpose in light of the foregoing factors. In Van Zandt, how-
ever, the court, in examining the rental payments made by the
physician-taxpayer for the use of the trust property, merely noted
the lack of an independent trustee and the retention of the rever-
sionary interest,2 6 and stressed the absence of any basic, underlying
18. See, e.g., Brown v. Commissioner, supra note 17; Skemp v. Commissioner,
supra note 16; John T. Potter, 27 T.C. 200 (1956); Albert T. Felix, 21 T.C. 794
(1954), nonacq., 1956 INT. RE:v. BULL. No. 43, at 7. In Van Zandt v. Commissioner,
341 F.2d 440 (5th Cir. 1965), affirming 40 T.C. 824 (1963), a case decided against
the taxpayer, the trustee was not independent.
19. In John T. Potter, supra note 18, the trustees were the grantor's wife, father,
and attorney. The use of the grantor's attorney as the trustee has been quite common.
See Brown v. Commissioner, supra note 17; Consolidated Apparel Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 207 F.2d 580 (7th Cir. 1953). For the view that the trustees in both Brown
and Skemp were not really independent, see Note, 65 Hv. L. REv. 1250 (1952).
20. Brown v. Commissioner, supra note 17; Skemp v. Commissioner, supra note 16.
21. Van Zandt v. Commissioner, supra note 17; Hall v. Commissioner, 208 F.
Supp 584 (N.D.N.Y.) 1962). There, three physicians conveyed a one-third interest
in the medical property to a trust company, naming their children as beneficiaries.
The trustee then leased to each doctor the office space used by him. In disallowing
the deductibility of the rental payments, the court based its decision upon the
revocability of the trust, the retention of the reversionary interest by the grantors
or their estates, the power of the grantors to settle the accounts of the trustee, and
the grantors' retention of an equity interest in the property.
22. Kirschenmann v. Westover, supra note 13; Hall v. Commissioner, supra note
21.
23. See Froehling, Clifford Trusts: Use of Partnership Interests as Corpus; Lease-
back Arrangements, 52 CALr. L. REv. 956, 976 (1964). The writer could find no
justifiable reason for discriminating against the rental of property by one who possesses
an ownership interest in the property other than his leasehold interest. Such a rule
would have an adverse effect on many business transactions, such as precluding the
lessor of a master supermarket from being a subtenant of his lessee.
24. See text accompanying notes 29 & 30 supra.




business purpose as the ground for disallowing the deduction. View-
ing the leaseback as a single transaction, the court reasoned that
there was no business purpose for the creation of the trust other
than the desire to effect a tax reduction.
In the instant case, the court, in upholding the deductibility of
the rental payments, distinguished Van Zandt on two principal
grounds. The primary distinction was the independence of the
trustee. This independence was not impaired by the grantors' power
to appoint a successor trustee in the event of resignation.27 Secondly,
the court pointed to the lack of a reversionary interest in the tax-
payer. The fact that the trust agreement provided for the return of
the assets to the grantors upon the termination of the trust
was not controlling in view of the subsequent conveyance of the
husband's undivided one-half interest in the remainder to his
wife prior to the tax years in question.28 In addition, the court
noted the absence of any retained equity in the property.
According to the court's definition of equity,29 the taxpayer, upon
relinquishing his reversionary interest, ceased to have an equity in
the property within the meaning of section 162(a) (3). 30 Having
distingushed Van Zandt, and not objecting to tax advantages per se,31
the court refused to consider the Van Zandt requirement that the
gift itself be motivated by a business purpose. Under the factual
situation presented in the case, the true test of business purpose
should be the necessity of the rental payments after the making of the
gift. Viewed in this light, the petitioner, following the establishment
of the trust, was in need of a medical office, and since the rental
payments were reasonable, the taxpayer complied with the Code
requirements that the expenses be "ordinary and necessary" and
"required to be made as a condition to continued use.., of property."
The court in the principal case has, in effect, made the reasonable-
ness of the rent, the independence of the trustee, the irrevocable
nature of the trust, and the lack of a reversionary interest conclusive
as to the issue of a business purpose. This result has been accomp-
27. Alden B. Oakes, supra note 2, at 529.
28. Id. at 530.
29. In defining the term equity, the court stated: "[O]ne has an 'equity' in property
when he has a right to redemption, a reversionary interest, a right to specific per-
formance, or in general any right respecting property which traditionally would have
been enforceable by means of an equitable remedy." Ibid.
30. The court rejected the Commissioner's argument that the petitioners' power
to approve and settle the account of the trustee constituted an equity within the
meaning of the Code. The court pointed to the trustees right to have the account
settled by a court of competent jurisdiction. Ibid.
31. Id. at 2664. The court relied on United States v. Cumberland, 338 U.S.
451 (1950); Commissioner v. Tower, 327 U.S. 80 (1946); Gregory v. Helvering,
293 U.S. 465 (1935); and United States v. Isham, 84 U.S. 496 (1873).
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lished by a liberalization, or perhaps distortion, of the business pur-
pose test advanced in Van Zandt.32 Whereas the Van Zandt ap-
proach appears to be a throw-back to the sham transaction doctrine
voiced in Johnson,33 and relied on by the Tax Court in Brown,3 the
present case indicates that the Tax Court henceforth will not be
influenced by the motivation underlying the gift. This refusal to
apply the sham transaction doctrine seems desirable, since it would
appear that the divesting nature of the instant transaction consti-
tuted more than a "mere paper reallocation of income among family
members."1 That definite economic interests have been created in
the grantors' children seems to have been recognized, as the Tax
Court refused to disallow the deduction on the basis of the "eco-
nomic reality'3 6 test espoused in Van Zandt. Furthermore, to deny
deductibility would be, in effect, to impose a double tax, in that the
rental payments, chargeable under the Clifford sections as income to
either the trust or the beneficiaries, would also be included in the
compilation of the grantor's taxable income. While it is true that
there may not be a "presumption against double taxation," there is
"an inherent reluctance to impose double taxation." 37 The possi-
bility of inequitable hardships, which was alluded to in Skemp38 is
apparent, since the disallowance of the deduction does not invalidate
the trust for other purposes. To give legal effect to the trust arrange-
ment, and at the same time to refuse rental deductions for failure to
comply with section 162(a) (3), would produce an anomaly, for
32. See Beausang, Tax Court in Oakes Gives New Life to Trust-Leaseback as a Tax-
Saving Device, 23 J. TAXATION 156, 158 (1965). The writer concludes that the de-
cisions in Van Zandt and Oakes may be reconciled in that a business purpose for
the whole transaction must be shown only if the elements of control are different than
those present in Oakes. (The example given is the grantors desire to retain the re-
versionary interest.)
33. Supra note 15.
34. Ibid.
35. Commissioner v. Tower, supra note 31, at 292.
36. The Tax Court in Van Zandt insisted that economic reality, rather than the
validity of the documents creating the trusts, the transfer and the leases, must control.
It is apparent that in the present case the Tax Court thought the transaction was
economically real.
37. 1 MEmvrTEs, op. cit. supra note 9, § 3.32.
38. In finding that the payments, though voluntary, were required, the court
stated: "While the taxpayer voluntarily created the situation which required the
payments of rent, the fact remains that the situation created did require the pay-
ments. In this case we have a valid, irrevocable trust, wholly divesting the taxpayer
of any interest in the trust property, and an agreement by the taxpayer to pay the
trustee a reasonable rental under a valid lease. . . . The trustee was duty bound to
exact rent of the taxpayer and the taxpayer was legally bound to pay, just as much
as if the taxpayer had moved across the street into the property of a third party. No
one doubts that he would have had to pay rent then, and would have been entitled
to deduct it even though he had voluntarily created that situation." Skemp v. Com-
missioner, supra note 16, at 600. See also Froehling, supra note 23, at 977.
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the legal validity of the trust under trust law assures that the rental
payments are "ordinary and necessary" and "required" within the
meaning of the Code.
Taxation-Federal Income Tax-Transaction Giving Rise
to Interest Deduction Must Have Independent Economic
Significance, or Deduction Will Be Disallowed
Taxpayer won 140,000 dollars in the 1958 Irish Sweepstakes. In
order to reduce her tax bill for that year, she borrowed, through an
intermediary, 945,000 dollars on which she prepaid interest of 81,400
dollars in December 1958. "She then claimed a deduction for the pre-
paid interest in her 1958 cash basis return,1 relying on section 163 (a)
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.2 The sum borrowed was used
to puchase treasury notes3 which served as collateral for the loan.
Under the terms of the agreement, the lending banks could sell the
collateral at any time and apply the proceeds of the sale to the
taxpayer's account. The Commissioner disallowed the deduction and
assessed a tax deficiency. On petition to the Tax Court of the United
States, held, the Commissioner's action was correct. The deduction
was properly disallowed because the prepayments did not constitute
1. Under the progressive tax rate structure, the ordinary income taxes due on
taxpayer's wagering income would have been $69,600. The interest deduction claimed
reduced her 1958 taxable income to $41,000, on which there would be only $13,900
in federal taxes dues. Thus, the tax savings in 1958 would have been $55,700. The
following table illustrates the anticipated result of taxpayer's plan:
1958 1959 1960 1961 Total
Net interest income $ -0- $11,250 $11,250 $ 5,625 $28,125
Gain on bond sales -0- -0- 15,000 26,250 41,250
Total income -0- 11,250 26,250 31,875 69,375
Interest expense 81,400 -0- -0- -0- 81,400
Fees and commissions 6,500 -0- -0- -0- 6,500
Total expense 87,900 -0- -0- -0- 87,900
Before tax gain (loss) (87,900) 11,250 26,250 31,875 ( 18,525)
Net tax saving (loss) 55,700 ( 1,700) ( 3,800) ( 3,600) 46,600
Net gain (loss) ($32,200) $ 9,550 $22,450 $28,275 $28,075
2. Section 163(a) states: "There shall be allowed as a deduction all interest paid
or accrued within the taxable year on indebtedness."
3. U.S. Treasury Notes, 1.5% series, face amount $500,000, due October 1, 1962, at
92 30/32 ($464,687) plus accrued interest of $1,875. The Treasury obligations matur-
ing in 1962 had a yield to maturity of approximately 3.64% as opposed to taxpayer's
initial true interest cost of 4.16%. U.S. Treasury Notes, 1.5% series, face amount
$500,000, due October 1, 1961, at 95 6/32 ($477,812) plus accrued interest of
$1,875. The Treasury obligations maturing in 1961 had a yield to maturity of ap-
proximately 3.42% as opposed to taxpayer's initial true interest cost of 4.16%.
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interest on indebtedness within the intendment of section 163(a),
which would limit the interest deduction to instances where there is
economic substance involved in taxpayer's borrowing. Kapel Gold-
stein, 44 T.C. 284 (1965).
The language of section 163(a) allows taxpayers a deduction for
interest expense on indebtedness paid during the taxable year without
regard to the nature of the expense. Judicial interpretation of section
163(a) has narrowed its scope in three ways. Goodstein v. Commis-
sioner4 held that the giving of a note by a cash basis taxpayer did
not constitute an interest payment for the purpose of section 163(a).
Lynch v. Commissioner5 held that a loan made by a vendor-creditor
to his vendee-debtor in order to allow the vendee to carry obligations
which in turn served as collateral for the loan did not constitute in-
debtedness for the purpose of section 163(a). While Goodstein and
Lynch dealt with factual situations where taxpayer and the creditor
had colluded, Knetsch v. United States6 disallowed an interest deduc-
tion in an arm's length transaction where the taxpayer systematically
borrowed against the increment to cash value on single premium
annuity contracts and used the proceeds of these loans to pay, in part,
interest expense on loans against these contracts. Knetsch looked
to the policy decision of Gregory v. Helvering which requires the
4. 267 F.2d 127 (1st Cir. 1959), affirming 30 T.C. 1178 (1958). The Tax Court
held that the transaction lacked substance and profit motive, other than tax avoidance,
and disallowed the deduction. While the Court of Appeals affirmed on the narrower
ground that the giving of a note by a cash basis taxpayer did not constitute a payment,
the case is frequently cited in support of the sham transaction doctrine. The Court
of Appeals was convinced that no genuine indebtedness existed between taxpayer and
his alleged creditor.
5. 273 F.2d 867 (1st Cir.), affirming 31 T.C. 990 (1959). The decision of the
Court of Appeals in this case was narrower than that of the Supreme Court in
Knetsch, infra note 6, for, in Lynch, the transaction between taxpayer and the vendor-
creditor were admittedly collusive.
6. 346 U. S. 361 (1960). Knetsch purchased from an insurance company 10 single.
premium annuity bonds to mature 30 years from issue date. Face amount was
$4,000,000. Purchase price was $4,004,000. Knetsch paid insurer $4,000 and signed
non-recourse notes for the balance, securing the loan with the cash value of the bonds.
Interest on the notes was at 3 %; the bonds bore interest of 2 %. Each year,
Knetsch borrowed substantially all the increase in cash value which he then applied
to his payments of interest. Knetsch surrendered the bonds after two years. He had
paid insurer $81,570 more than he had borrowed. His "interest payments"
totalled $290,570 ($143,465 in 1953 and $147,105 in 1954). Had the plan worked,
Knetsch's tax savings would have been $233,297. The record does not indicate that the
transaction was other than an arm's-length bargain. See also Carpenter v. Commis-
sioner, 322 F.2d 733 (3d Cir. 1963), affirming 21 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 975 (1962)
(transaction without economic substance disregarded for tax purposes).
7. 293 U.S. 465 (1935). This case involved a reorganization under chapter 234
of the 1924 Act. Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 203(c), 43 Stat. 256. Taxpayer
had complied with this provision and was attempting to utilize the non-recognition
provision of chapter 852. Revenue Act of 1928, ch. 852, § 112(9), 45 Stat. 818.
Taxpayer had marketable securities transferred from her wholly owned corporation to
a corporation newly created for just this purpose, it having no other business
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activity for which the taxpayer seeks a deduction to be a type of
activity for which Congress intended to grant a deduction.8 An
examination of "what was done'9 in Knetsch led the Court to conclude
that the transaction should be disregarded for tax purposes. One
writer has suggested that Knetsch implicitly incorporated the "business
purpose" doctrine of Gregory into the interest deduction. 10 On the
other hand, the Tax Court in L. Lee Stanton" held that interest on
genuine indebtedness' 2 was deductible unless taxpayer colluded with
another party to avoid taxes. Stanton was distinguished from Good-
stein and Lynch on the grounds that the interest payments in Stanton
were made to an independent lending institution.13
In the instant case, taxpayer had no personal dealings with the
lending banks; he allowed an intermediary to set up the transactions,
and neither bank ran a credit check on the taxpayer. The court im-
plied that these steps are necessary under generally accepted pro-
cedures of sound financial management. As the banks had the
exclusive discretion to apply the proceeds of sale of the notes
to the taxpayer's account, the taxpayer never had uncontrolled use
of either the money or the securities. These factors led the court to
conclude that the banks were looking to the notes, rather than to
the taxpayer, to recover the funds which the banks had supplied,
and that the "interest" paid by taxpayer was a fee to the bank for
providing the facade of a loan transaction. Further, absent tax
savings inuring from the prepayment of interest, there was no antici-
pation of commercial or economic gain from the transactions entered
into by taxpayer. Therefore, the transactions were not in substance
interests. The newly created corporation was then liquidated to enable taxpayer
to sell the securities received in liquidation, and thus realize a substantial long-term
capital gain. The Court held this transaction to be substantially a dividend payment
by the former corporation to petitioner, thus denying her the desired capital gain
treatment.
8. Id. at 469. See Chisolm v. Commissioner, 79 F.2d 14-15 (2d Cir. 1935), for a
contemporary appraisal of the significance of Gregory and a suggestion as to the
manner of its application.
9. Knetsch v. United States, supra note 6.
10. Fuller, Business Purpose, Sham Transactions and the Relation of Private Law to
the Law of Taxation, 37 TutL. L. REv. 355 (1963); Guterman, Substance v. Form in
the Taxation of Personal and Business Transactions, N.Y.U. 20r INST. ox FED. TAX
951, 958-59 (1962).
11. 34 T.C. 1, (1960). See also Maysteel Products Co., 33 T.C. 1021, rev'd, 287
F.2d 429 (7th Cir. 1961) (deduction of amortization of bond premium and deduc-
tion at fair market value for charitable contribution of the bonds while they sold at a
premium were both allowed).
12. The Commissioner conceded the genuineness of the transactions in Stanton,
arguing that the transactions were devoid of commercial and economic substance.
L. Lee Stanton, 34 T.C. 1, 9 (1960).
13. "Independent" was used by the court to indicate that the loan was negotiated
in arm's length transaction.
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what they appeared to be in form, had no substantive commercial
reality, and must be disallowed. The dissent, however, found the
loan, the purchase and pledge of collateral, and the sale of collateral
in satisfaction of the loan to be genuine financial and commercial
transactions upon which tax consequences could be based under
Gregory v. Helvering,14 which would disregard tax motive in an
otherwise genuine transaction. The dissent would follow the holding
of the Tax Court in L. Lee Stanton 5 that interest on genuine indebted-
ness is deductible; it saw no grounds for distinguishing Stanton.6
Further, section 163(a), by its plain meaning, would allow a deduc-
tion; and the remedy for tax avoidance possibilities created thereby
lies with Congress, not the courts.
The transactions in the instant case were not merely a matter of
form. Taxpayer dealt at arm's length with independent lending
institutions, and bona fide debtor-creditor relationships were created
as a result of the dealings. Nor were the transactions without eco-
nomic significance independent of tax consequences, for fluctuations
in the market interest rate would affect the value of the notes taxpayer
had purchased.17 However, an objective appraisal of taxpayer's
economic purpose for entering into the transactions clearly indicates
that there could have been no economic purpose other than tax
avoidance. Application of an objective business purpose standard
to individual interest deductions allegedly entered into for the
production of income presents little difficulty in a case such as
Knetsch or the instant case, for in both the probability of economic
'gain, apart from tax savings, was minimal. Such a standard will be
increasingly more difficult of application, however, as the probability
of economic gain increases in any particular instance, even though
the greatest economic consideration involved in the transaction is
tax savings. Such a solution leaves a large gray area where taxpayers
act at their own risk. Further, it might well be asked whether the
Court in Knetsch was correct in its incorporation of the business
purpose requirement into the individual interest deduction, for an
individual is clearly allowed a deduction for interest expense incurred
when he borrows to finance a purely personal item and no inquiry
14. Supra note 7.
15. 34 T.C. 1 (1960).
16. Kapel Goldstein, 44 T.C. 284, 302 (1965) (dissenting opinion). The majority
distinguished Stanton from the fact situation in Max Barnett, 44 T.C. 261, 281 (1965),
which distinction was incorporated into the opinion of the court in Goldstein.
17. Subsequent government borrowings were made at higher rates of interest. This
made taxpayer's bonds less attractive, comparatively, to prospective investors and caused
a decline in their value. Had the reverse been true, the taxpayer might have realized
a net before-tax gain from the transaction, although such a result appeared highly
unlikely to the taxpayer and her advisors.
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will be made into the purpose for his borrowing. It is submitted that,
if the courts are going to continue to legislate in the area of the
individual interest deduction, they should restrict themselves to
instances where the transaction is purely formal.
Taxation-Insurance Companies-
The Interplay Between Tax-Exempt Income
and the Reserve Deduction
The Life Insurance Company Income Tax Act of 1959, Section
804 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as amended,1 provides
the formula for determining the taxable income of insurance com-
panies. According to the "basic" formula, each item of investment
income, including interest from tax-exempt securities, is divided
proportionately into a company's share and a policyholders' share.-'
The company is then taxed on its share of the investment income, less
a deduction for the tax-exempt income included in that share. 3 Sub-
1. 73 Stat. 115 (1959), 26 U.S.C. § 804 (1964), amending Int. Rev. Code, of 1954,
ch. 736, 68A Stat. 258,
2. Under the 1959 Act the "policyholders' share" of income is that amount of in-
come which is assumed (on the basis of actuarial predictions) sufficient when added
to reserves to meet the predicted policyholder and other contract obligations for the
year in question. The amount allocated to the company is the balance of the income
after these claims have been met. Each dollar of investment income is allocated
between these two "shares" in the same proportion as each share bears to total
investment income.
3. "(2) TAXABLE INVESTMENT INcom DEFiNED.-For purposes of this part, the
taxable investment income for any taxable year shall be an amount (not less
than zero) equal to the sum of the life insurance company's share of each and every
item of investment yield (including tax-exempt interest, partially tax-exempt interest,
and dividends received), reduced by . . . (a) the sum of . . . (1) the life insurance
company's share of interest which under section 103 is excluded from gross income
.... 73 Stat. 115 (1959), 26 U.S.C. § 804(a)(2) (1964), amending Int. Rev.
Code of 1954, ch. 736, 68A Stat. 258 (1954). The act provides a three-phase pro-
cedure for taxation of life insurance companies. Under phase one the tax base is the
investment sources less investment expenses and deduction of the companies share of
exempt interest, as described above. Under phase two the tax base represents 50%
of the excess of total net income from all sources-"gains from operations"--over taxable
investment income. The excess, if it exists, results from underwriting gains or savings
resulting from fewer deaths than expected, and any reduced expenses in servicing
policies. Phase three imposes a tax on certain underwriting gains made available to
shareholders which are not taxed under phase two. See generally Life Ins. Co. Income
Tax Act of 1959, 73 Stat. 115, 26 U.S.C. §§ 801-820 (1964), amending Int. Rev.
Code of 1954, ch. 736, 68A Stat. 258. For purposes of this article, the discussion is
limited to the tax base under phase one above. This enables the discussion to con-
centrate on the constitutional aspects of the tax treatment of tax-exempts and the
arguments raised by counsel in the instant case. To the extent that phase two raises
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section 804(a) (6), set forth under the heading "Exception," provides
that if any application of the foregoing formula should result in the
imposition of a tax on tax-exempt securities, "adjustment shall be
made to the extent necessary to prevent such imposition."4
The Atlas Insurance Company, having been taxed according to the
basic formula without any adjustment under 804(a) (6), sued for a
refund claiming that under this section it was entitled to an "adjust-
ment" allowing for the deduction of the total amount of tax-exempt
income received. Atlas argued that Congress had intended subsection
804(a) (6) to apply to the typical case; they argued further that irres-
pective of congressional intent the application of the basic formula
alone would result in the "imposition of a tax" on tax-exempt income,
thereby requiring the application of sub-section 804(a) (6). The
District Court rejected these claims, but the Tenth Circuit reversed.
On appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States, held, reversed.
Congress did not intend the "adjustment" provisions, section 804(a)
(6), to apply to the typical case, and the application of the basic
formula does not impose a tax on tax-exempt income. United States
v. Atlas Life Insurance Co., 381 U.S. 233 (1965).
Traditionally in the case of insurance companies the amount of
income which will be taxed has been subject to two limitations:
(1) the instrumentalities of one government body are immune from
taxation by another government body,5 and (2) the portion of an
insurance company's "income," which must be reserved to meet the
policyholders' claims against the company is not included in the corn-
these same issues, they have been covered in the present discussion. Therefore,
no attempt has been made to direct the discussion at phase two or to refer specifically
to the "exception" clause of that phase which is exactly analogous to the "exception"
clause of phase one discussed fully in this article.
4. "(6) ExcEano.-If it is established in any case that the application of the
definition of taxable investment income contained in paragraph (2) results in the
imposition of tax on... (A) any interest which under section 103 is excluded from gross
income . . . adjustment shall be made to the extent necessary to prevent such imposi-
tion." 73 Stat. 115 (1959), 26 U.S.C. § 804(a) (6) (1964), amending Int. Rev. Code
of 1954, ch. 736, 68A Stat. 258 (1954).
5. The original immunity for government securities was established in McCulloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316 (1819), and has had a history of affirmance ever
since. Wurzel, Tax-exempt Interest of Life Insurance Companies: A Study in "Dis-
criminatory" Taxation, 70 YALE L.J. 17 (1960). However, the petitioner in the instant
case did suggest that such immunity might fall if it were contested before the courts
today. Brief for Petitioner, p. 67, United States v. Atlas Life Ins. Co., 381 U.S. 233
(1965) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Petitioner]. There would, of course, be no
objection to the federal government taxing its own bonds, but it has traditionally re-
frained from doing so. The present federal exemption for all government bonds is set
forth in the INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 103(a): "(a) General rule. Gross income does
not include interest on-(1) the obligations of a State, a Territory, or a possession of
the United States, or of any political subdivision of any of the foregoing, or of the
District of Columbia ... 
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pany's taxable income.6 The extent to which an insurance company
may be entitled to both of these exemptions in their entirety has
been the subject of much litigation and legislative re-evaluation.
The Insurance Act of 1921 placed a tax on a company's investment
income, defined as the gross income from interest, dividends, and
rents, less deductions for (a) interest from tax-exempt securities,
and (b) an amount of income presumed necessary to meet annual
policy claims against the company. The deduction for annual policy
claims, however, was to be reduced by the amount of, tax-exempt
interest received.7  The general application of this formula was
6. The business of a life insurance company consists of incurring obligations, pri-
marily to policyholders, and investing the funds obtained through such obligations.
The premiums charged for insurance are calculated on the assumption that the
premiums received will be invested and earn interest, which, when added to the
accumulated premiums, will be sufficient to pay the obligations as they become due.
State law normally guards the financial integrity of insurance companies by requiring
that they maintain a "reserve fund" sufficient to meet the actuarially predicted annual
policyholder claims against them. The mortality tables and the assumed rate of
interest used in the computations are regulated by state law; and if the net assets of
the company fall below the reserve so computed, the company is deemed insolvent
and may no longer continue in business.
Since the reserve is computed by "discounting" the predicted policyholder claims
to the present at the assumed rate of interest, it is obviously necessary, if the reserve
is to continue to measure the company's ability to meet its policyholder obligations,
that the reserve be increased each year by an amount equal to the interest which the
assets represented by the reserve would presumably earn. Thus, out of the income
actually earned each year from the investment of the premium receipts, a certain
portion-that part representing the assumed rate of interest-must be "set aside" and
added to the reserve to "fund" the anticipated policyholder obligations. Brief for
Petitioner, p. 4. This annual addition to the "reserve fund," termed the "policyholder
reserve" in the 1959 Act, is a requirement of state law intended to keep the reserve
fund up to date.
Whether these "funds" so obligated to the policyholder claims against the company
be considered expenses of the insurance business or whether they are considered "funds"
held in trust for the creditors of the company, it is clear that they do not represent
profit or "beneficial ownership" to the company, and it would be inequitable to tax
them as such. Consequently, taxable income of insurance companies has traditionally
not included income allocated to meet these policyholder claims. The annual allocation
generally runs about 3 % of the company's total policy obligations. HUEBNER & BLACK,
L .FE INSURANCE 192 (5th ed. 1958). It also constitutes typically about 85% of a
company's annual investment income. Wurzel, supra note 5, at 21. It is further sug-
gested that Congress permits the "reserve deduction" in an attempt to keep premium
rates at a minimum and thereby encourage the health of the insurance industry. Id. at
19. Similar deductions for the company's reserve obligations may apply to state
property taxes on net worth. In such cases, the total reserve fund rather than the
annual increment thereto is the measure of the "reserve deduction."
7. "See. 244. (a) That in the case of a life insurance company the term 'gross
income' means the gross amount of income received during the taxable year from
interest, dividends, and rents ....
"Sec. 245. (a) That in the case of a life insurance company the term 'net income'
means the gross income less
(1) [interest on tax-exempt securities] ...
(2) An amount equal to the excess, if any, over the deduction specified in para-
graph (1) of this subdivision of 4 per centum of the mean of the reserve funds re-
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challenged in National Life Insurance Co. v. United States.8 The
taxpayer argued that a tax formula was invalid to the extent that
any adverse tax consequences were made to follow from the owner-
ship of tax-exempt securities:
The Government can tax anything it pleases, except tax-exempts; but it
must deduct tax-exempts from anything on which it imposes taxes....
"The state, in making any deduction or in granting any privilege, cannot
make the ownership of tax-exempt securities result in the taxpayer getting a
less benefit or privilege than he would have had if he had not owned them,
because the minute you do that, you are putting a burden on the ownership
of the tax-exempt securities.9
The Court found that the formula imposed a tax on tax-exempt
income and held that it was invalid to the extent that it reduced
the reserve deduction by the amount of tax-exempt income. The
Court did not, however, go so far as to hold that any adverse tax
consequences flowing from the receipt of tax-exempt income was
the equivalent of a tax on such income. Instead, it based its decision
on a more limited principle: "One may not be subjected to greater
burdens upon his taxable property solely because he owns some that
is free. No device or form of words can deprive . . .the tax-
payer] of the exemption for which he has lawfully contracted."10
This rationale, known as the "National Life doctrine," has been ap-
plied to analogous tax formulas with varying interpretations."
In the Gehner case, 12 a Missouri insurance company brought suit
to contest a state property tax on the taxable assets of insurance
companies, less deductions for legally required reserves.13 The Mis-
quired by law, and held at the beginning and end of the taxable year.... ".The
Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, 42 Stat. 261.
8. National Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 277 U.S. 508 (1928).
9. Id. at 512 (Emphasis added).
10. Id. at 519.
11. At least part of the difficulty in interpreting the National Life case stems from
an inconsistency between what the Court said and what the Court did. To prevent
"greater burdens" on taxable income as a result of the receipt of nontaxable income,
the Court need only require that the "pro rata share" of deductions per unit of taxable
income remains the same. The Court, however, permitted the full reserve deduction
notwithstanding increased proportionate ownership of tax-exempt income; thus taxable
income was permitted more than its pro rata share of the reserve deduction. See note
17 infra and accompanying text. Permitting an effective deduction means that the
deduction is being allowed against taxable income. To charge a deduction or any
part of it against nontaxable income results in no deduction at all for the part so
charged. There can be no effective tax deduction where there is no tax basis to
reduce, and tax-exempts, by definition, do not form a portion of the tax basis.
12. Missouri ex rel. Missouri Ins. Co. v. Gehner, 281 U.S. 313 (1930).
13. "The property of all insurance companies organized under the laws of this
state shall be. subject to taxation . . . .Every such company or association shall make
returns, subject to the provisions of said law: First, of all the real estate held or
controlled by it; second, of the net value of all its other assets or values in excess
of the legally required reserve necessary to reinsure its outstanding risks and of any
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souri court had held that the deduction could be taken for only that
proportion of the total legal reserves as taxable assets bore to total
assets.14 The taxpayer demanded the total reserve deduction. The
United States Supreme Court held for the taxpayer purportedly under
the National Life doctrine.15 In interpreting this doctrine the court
said:
[W]here as in this case the ownership of United States bonds is made the
basis of denying the full exemption which is accorded to those who own no
such bonds this amounts to an infringement of the guaranteed freedom from
taxation. It is clear that the value of appellant's government bonds was not
disregarded in making up the estimate of taxable net values. That is in
violation of the established rule [of the National Life case].
16
As was pointed out by Justice Stone in his well reasoned dissent,17 this
holding was not in accord with the National Life doctrine and in effect
was an adoption of the position previously advocated by the National
Life Insurance Company, namely that "ownership of tax-exempt
securities [cannot] result in the taxpayer getting a less benefit or
privilege than he would have had if he had not owned them."'8
unpaid policy claims, which net values shall be assessed and taxed as the property
of individuals ...." Mo. REV. STAT. § 6386 (1919).
14. The Missouri Supreme Court ". . . found the company's liabilities were charge-
able against all its assets-taxable and nontaxable alike-and declared that such re-
serve[s] . .. and claims should be apportioned between the two classes of assets
according to their respective amounts of total assets .... Missouri ex rel. Missouri Ins.
Co. v. Gehner, supra note 12, at 319. An asset's "pro rata share" of a deduction is
that portion of the deduction which bears the same ratio to the total deduction as
the asset bears to total assets.
15. "It necessarily follows from the immunity created by federal authority that a
State may not subject one to a greater burden upon his taxable property merely be-
cause he owns tax-exempt government securities ... " Missouri ex rel. Missouri Ins.
Co. v. Gelmer, supra note 12, at 321.
16. Ibid.
17. "[In National Life, the Court said,) 'one may not be subjected to greater
burdens upon his taxable property solely because he owns some that is free.'
"But the present statute has no such effect. Calling the deduction of policy lia-
bilities, required for the computation of the tax an 'exemption' and saying that
ownership of tax exempt securities is made the basis of denying the 'full exemption,'
may give this case a verbal resemblance to that, but it does no more. True, a change
by appellant from taxable to tax free investments would result in a smaller deduc-
tion from its taxable assets, but it would also result in a proportionate reduction of
its taxable assets with a corresponding decrease in taxable values, always in exact
proportion to appellants investment in tax exempt securities.
"Only if the taxpayer were the fortunate recipient of a gift of tax exempt securities
[ . . (would the deduction per unit of taxable values be decreased] and this not
solely or at all because its newly acquired securities are 'free,' but because they,
like its taxable assets, may be used to meet policy obligations, and thus proportionately
relieve taxable assets from that burden." Id. at 329 (Stone, J., dissenting).
18. National Life Ins. Co. v. United States, supra note 8, at 512. The Atlas In-
surance Company also contended that this was the effect of the Gehner holding. "Atlas
urge[d] that the rule of National Life, when read in conjunction with Missouri Ins. Co.
v. Gehner, supra note 12, means that a tax is imposed on tax-exempt interest when-
ever the liability of the taxpayer receiving such interest is greater than it would have
been if the tax-exempt interest had not been received." 381 U.S. at 244. The
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The "burden" which was imposed by this formula was a non-tax
burden; taxable and non-taxable assets alike had been charged with
meeting a share of the legal reserve requirements. As the propor-
tionate ownership of tax-exempt assets increased, their pro rata share 9
of the reserve requirements increased, reducing proportionately the
amount of the reserve requirement properly allowable as a deduction
from taxable assets.20 Since the tax "burden" imposed by that formula
was not discriminatory and had not changed with the receipt of tax
exempt assets, the formula was not in violation of the National Life
doctrine. The formula in the National Life case reduced the reserve
deduction by the full amount of tax-exempt interest, forcing tax-
exempt income to absorb more than a pro rata share of the reserve
deduction. As a result taxable income was denied its pro rata share
of the reserve deduction and the taxpayer was, indeed, "subjected to
greater burdens upon his taxable property solely because he owned
some that... [was] free."' 1
Only a year after the Gehner case, the majority holding of that case
was impliedly overruled by Denman v. Slayton.22 In Denman the tax-
payer contested the validity of Section 214(a) (2) of the Revenue
Act of 1921, which permitted an income tax deduction for interest
paid or accrued on all indebtedness except that incurred to purchase
tax-exempt securities.23 The taxpayer claimed that this exception
was an infringement on the constitutionally guaranteed immunities of
tax-exempt assets, and invoked both National Life and Gehner. In
essence, the claim of the taxpayer was the same as that in the Gehner
case, namely that the tax basis should be reduced for expenses or
reserve obligations properly allocable, in accounting theory, to
tax-exempts which are not a part of the tax basis.24 Without mention-
circuit court in ifnding for the Atlas Insurance Company accepted this as the holding
in Gehner. Comparing Atlas with Gehner, the circuit court said, "In both instances
the liability of the taxpayer is increased, solely by reason of the receipt of tax-exempt
interest, and no form or method for determining it can disguise its incidence. We
conclude . . . the . . . [1959] Act does result in the imposition of a tax on exempt
interest.. .-." Atlas Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 333 F.2d 389, 399 (10th Cir. 1964).
19. See note 14 supra.
20. The reserve deduction corresponds in amount to the legal reserve requirements,
and the legal reserve requirements are intended to correspond to the obligations of
the company. For this reason the terms "reserve deduction," "reserve requirement or
reserve fund" and company "obligations" refer to a corresponding amount of dollars
and are often interchangeable in use.
21. National Life Ins. Co. v. United States, supra note 8, at 519.
22. Denman v. Slayton, 282 U.S. 514 (1931).
23. "Sec. 214(a). That in computing net income there shall be allowed as deduc-
tions: ... (2) All interest paid or accrued with the taxable year on indebtedness,
except on indebtedness incurred or continued to purchase or carry obligations or
securities . . .the interest upon which is wholly exempt from taxation. ... Revenue
Act of 1921, ch. 136, 42 Stat. 239.
24. The Denman case denies a deduction for obligations incurred directly by the
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ing the Gehner case, the Court necessarily repudiated it and estab-
lished the principles which presently govern the treatment of tax-
exempts:
While guaranteed exemptions must be strictly observed, this obligation is not
inconsistent with reasonable classification designed to subject all to the pay-
ment of their just share of a burden fairly imposed.... The classification
complained of is not arbitrary, makes no improper discrimination, does not
result in defeating any guaranteed exemption, and was within the power of
Congress.25
This position was reaffirmed in Helvering v. Independent Life Insur-
ance Co.26 in which the Court upheld the limitation of tax deductions
for real estate expenses to those expenses related to real estate which
produced taxable income.27 The Court held that this did not dis-
criminate against tax-exempt uses of the real estate and cited Denman
for the position that limiting deductions to expenses attributable to or
incurred in producing taxable income or taxable assets is a legitimate
and separate concept from the "taxation of exempt securities con-
demned in National Life Ins. Co. v. United States."2
To summarize, the present principles governing tax-exempt assets
are first, that such assets are to be immune from direct taxation. Any
indirect means aimed solely at defeating this immunity must fall, and
acquisition of tax-exempt assets. There is no plan for apportionment of existing deduc-
tions to all assets as there was in Gehner, and therefore there can be no decrease of a
previous deduction with the acquisition of tax-exempts. The taxpayer in Atlas at-
tempted to distinguish Denman from Gehner on these grounds. "[In Gehner] ex-
penses would have been incurred in any event and would have been fully deductible
if no exempt income had been received.
"[Tio disallow a deduction for such an expense because of the receipt of a tax-
exempt interest would be a radical departure from the policy of exemption .... "
Brief for Respondent p. 46. United States v. Atlas Life Ins. Co., 381 U.S. 233 (1965).
However this is a difference in appearance only. In both cases the obligations for
which reserve deductions are demanded did, indeed, result in the acquisition of tax-
exempt receipts, and the link between the obligations and the tax-exempts is of the
same force in both cases. See notes 55 & 56 infra. In Gehner the taxpayer was
allowed to apply the reserve deduction corresponding to these obligations to exclusively
taxable income. In Denman the taxpayer was not permitted to apply a deduction
corresponding to such obligations to taxable income, and Denman necessarily overrules
Gehner. "[T]hus the Court not only refused to follow the implications of Gehner
in the context of the federal income tax, but also sustained the propriety of disallow-
ing the expense attributable to the production of nontaxable income. Such disallowance
was not to impose an impermissible burden on the exempt receipts." 381 U.S. at 246.
25. Denman v. Slayton, supra note 22, at 519.
26. Helvering v. Independent Life Ins. Co., 292 U.S. 371 (1934).
27. "Sec. 245(b). No deduction shall be made . . . [for taxes, exhaustion, wear and
tear of property, obsolescence] on account of any real estate owned and occupied in
whole or in part by a life insurance company unless there is included in the return
of gross income the rental value of the space so occupied. Such rental value shall not
be less than... 4 per centum per annum of the book value . . . of the real estate so
owned or occupied." Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, 42 Stat. 261.
28. Helvering v. Independent Life Ins. Co., supra note 26, at 381.
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in this respect, the National Life doctrine is good law. Beyond
this, tax-exempt assets are not immune from bearing the burdens
which are naturally and rightfully incident to their ownership. Thus,
they must pay their pro rata share of the reserve obligations, and a
"reserve deduction" corresponding to this share of reserve obligations
cannot be applied against taxable receipts.
Following the express overruling of the tax formula of the 1921
Act in the National Life case, life insurance companies were permitted
full and separate deductions for both tax-exempt income and reserve
obligations. Dissatisfied with this result, Congress introduced a new
formula in the Revenue Act of 1941,29 which in effect charged
tax-exempt income with a pro rata share of reserve obligations. This
charge was based upon an industry-wide calculation of total annual
reserve obligations (determined by actuarial and interest tables)
and annual net income. The percentage of the former to the latter
was applied to the net income of a particular company to arrive at
its reserve deduction. This formula was not contested by taxpayers,
apparently for two reasons: (1) the industry-wide reserve deduction
percentage was so great that the individual company's net taxable
investment income was miniscule; (2) each company could minimize
its tax burden by purchasing tax-exempt securities because the income
therefrom was not included in the computation of the individual tax
liability.3 °
This industry-wide calculation was unsatisfactory due to the
fact that it resulted in an erratic variance in tax liabilities for
successive years and it was not directly related to each company to
which it was applied.31 The 1959 Act continued to charge all income
with a pro rata share of reserve obligations, but the pro rata share was
determined on a company by company, rather than an industry wide
basis. The basic formula dividing all investment income between a
company's share and a policyholders' share indicates an intent not
to permit complete and separate deductions for tax-exempt income
and reserve obligations. This apparent intent, however, is clouded
by the "exception" clause appended to the basic formula which
provides that if application of the basic formula should result in a
tax on tax-exempt income, "adjustment" shall be made to the extent
necessary to prevent such taxation.
32
29. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 202(b), as amended, ch. 619, 56 Stat. 870 (1942).
30. 333 F.2d at 395.
31. Wurzel, supra note 5, at 20.
32. A question of legislative interpretation is raised because the "exception" clause
is inconsistent with the basic formula of the act. If the "exception" clause were
intended to be of general application the apportionment formula would be ineffective.
If on the other hand, it were not meant to be of general application, and were not
so applied, the "exception" clause itself would be surplusage because it is not possible
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In sustaining the application of the basic formula without the ex-
ception clause tax formula in the instant case, the Court dealt
first with the issue of legislative interpretation and then with the
constitutional issue. Since the adjustment clause 804(a) (6) was
written as an "Exception," the Court held on the basis of the plain
meaning rule that it was not intended to be applicable to the typical
case.l3 "Otherwise the exception would become the rule and the
general formula of little, if any, utility."34 The Court found that
interpretation supported by the legislative history of the act. The
original House version of the bill, which contained essentially the
same limitation on reserve deductions as the final act, had been
proposed to prevent a double deduction for exempt interest. After
a thorough consideration of the argument that the limitation resulted
in a tax on tax-exempts, the proponents of the bill concluded that in
its general application the limitation would not result in a tax on
tax-exempt interest.36 The Court concluded that the "exception"
clause was not intended to be of general application, and had been
added simply as a safeguard to cover unusual situations which
Congress feared might arise.
37
to conceive of any unusual circumstances which, as opposed to the general case,
would result in the imposition of a tax on tax-exempt interest.
33. 381 U.S. at 239.
34. Id. at 240.
35. Ibid.
36. The Court relied on statements by the Senate Committee on Finance, and
Senator Byrd, chairman of the Committee, both of whom without mentioning the"exception" clause, stated that the purposes and effect of the law was to not impose
a tax on tax-exempt interest. Id. at 241. The taxpayer contended that these state-
ments were made with the view that the "exception" clause was to be of general
application. See note 44 infra and accompanying text. But there is no justification for
such an assertion.
A statement by Representative Mills, Chairman of the House Ways and Means
Committee, indicated that the "exception" clause was not considered necessary to avoid
the imposition of an unconstitutional tax. "'It is my belief that the appropriate
deduction was allowed by the House bill . . . [which included no "exception"
clause] and that these provisions of the final bill, which closely follow the Senate
amendment, make no change of substance.' 105 CoNG. Rim. 10412." 381 U.S. at 242.
37. "None of the materials called to our attention, however, explain why or for
what purpose Sections 804(a)(6) . . . (was) added to the Act, save for mere
recitations in the reports and the debates that an adjustment would be required in
any case where tax-exempt interest was shown to be subjected to tax. It may be that
Congress thought that peculiar facts and circumstances in particular cases would
require different treatment than the general formula would provide." Ibid.
The district court in finding for the government, decided that the "exception"
clause had been ". . . enacted by Congress to make doubly sure that tax-exempt
interest would not in fact be taxed and that if by some misapplication of the formula
or mathematical error it is taxed, then by application of these provisions an adjustment
would be made." Atlas Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 216 F. Supp. 461 (N. D. Okla.
1963).
The government contended before the Supreme Court that the "exception" clause
had a dual purpose. First, it deprived the Treasury Department of standing to attack
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The Court then found that the application of the basic formula
did not in fact result in the imposition of a tax on tax-exempt income
and the "exception" clause was therefore not required in the instant
case. The Court's argument followed generally the rationale of the
Denman case. After distinguishing the National Life casem and dis-
avowing the Gehner holding,39 the Court said,
We affirm the principle announced in Denman and Independent Life that
the tax laws may require tax-exempt income to pay its way. In our view,
Congress has done no more in the 1959 Act than to particularize this
principle in connection with taxing the income of Life insurance com-
panies.40
The Court noted the inherent logic of allowing deduction of ,receipts
used to meet the reserve requirements of insurance companies, and
of assessing those deductions against all receipts on a pro rata basis:
We see no sound reasons, legal or economic for distinguishing between
taxable and nontaxable dollars or for saying the reserve must be satisfied
by resort to taxable income alone. Interest on municipal bonds may be
exempt from tax, but this does not carry with it exemption from the com-
pany's obligation to add a large portion of investment income to policyholder
reserves.
41
The Court found "unrealistic" the argument that under this formula
a company would be penalized for investing "idle" funds in tax-
exempts or for obtaining tax-exempts when its taxable income and
its reserve obligations remain the same. In fact the company would
obtain a net benefit from investing "idle" funds in tax-exempts; and
in all probability increased ownership of tax-exempts will correspond
to increased obligations of the company which will in turn increase
the reserve deduction. More importantly, the Court held that there
was no constitutional requirement that the tax liabilities of a company
be unchanged under these varying circumstances. The difference in
tax liabilities "necessarily follows from the application of the prin-
the basic doctrine of tax immunity of government securities should the present
act be litigated. Senator Butler was quoted as saying, "The Treasury has been wait-
ing for this opportunity for years. The arguments are prepared. All that is needed
is the legal controversy .... Brief for Petitioner, p. 66. Hearings on H.R. 4245 Be-
fore the Senate Finance Committee, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 702 (1959). Second, the
"exception" clause was included to provide the proper remedy in the event that
Congress ". . . bad been mistaken in its judgment that the general taxing formula
did not tax exempt interest." Brief for Petitioner, p. 69. The appellate court and the
respondent before the Supreme Court of the United States both contended that the
"exception" clause was meant to supersede the general formula. See note 45 infra and
accompanying text.
38. 381 U.S. at 245.
39. Ibid.
40. Id. at 247.
41. Id. at 249.
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ciples of charging exempt income with a fair share of the burdens
properly allocable to it."
42
In the last analysis Atlas' insistence on both the full reserve and exempt-
income exclusions is tantamount to saying that those who purchase exempt
securities instead of taxable ones are constitutionally entitled to reduce their
tax liability and to pay less tax per taxable dollar than those owning no
such securities. The doctrine of intergovernmental immunity does not require
such a benefit to be conferred on the ownership of municipal bonds.
43
In the final analysis, the Court was correct in finding that Congress
did not intend the "exception" clause to be of general application.
Both parties agreed that the arguments relating to the tax treatment
due tax-exempt income were fully debated throughout the legislative
history of the act. The appellate court and the taxpayer erred, how-
ever, in assuming that the "exception" clause necessarily indicates
that Congress accepted the argument that the basic formula imposed
a tax on tax-exempt income and intended the "exception" clause to
supersede the basic formula in its general application.44 The legisla-
tive history relied on by the appellate court and the taxpayer showed
an intent by Congress not to tax tax-exempts, but it is not clear or
even plausible in some instances that they felt it was necessary
for the "exception" clause to be applied in the normal case to effect
this intent.45 The taxpayer further failed sufficiently to explain
42. Id. at 251.
43. Ibid.
44. Atlas Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 333 F.2d 389, 397 (10th Cir. 1964).
45. The appellate court and the respondent before the Supreme Court relied on the
following excerpts from the legislative history of the act: "When the Senate version
came to the floor for consideration the Chairman of the Finance Committee, reporting
on the bill, stated that it was 'the intention of the Committee not to impose any tax
on tax-exempt interest' and that the 'Treasury has assured the Committee that this
formula does not impose any tax on tax-exempt interest. The bill adds a proviso to the
effect that if the formula I have described does result in the imposition of a tax on
this item, the formula is to be adjusted so that it does not do so' 105 Cong. Record,
Part 6, p. 8401. A letter from the treasury . . . reviewed the statutory formula for
determining an insurance company's taxable income and, referring to the exception
sections, expressed the view that 'this additional language is not necessary, since we
can not envision a situation in which the operation of the proposed tax formula would
result in the substantive imposition of tax on municipal bond interest or on any
other form of tax-exempt income.' 105 Cong. Record, Part 6, p. 8402." Ibid. See
also Brief for Respondent, p. 24 n. 14. "Senator Curtis, who was asked to make the
detailed explanation of the statute, made the following statement on the floor of the
Senate before the amended version was adopted '. . . no tax-exempt income or
credits of life insurance companies will b& included in the tax base of such com-
panies, under this bill. This should allay any fear that any constitutional provision
is transgressed.' 105 Cong. Record, Part 6, p. 8429." Id. at 397 n. 13; Brief for
Respondent, p. 25 n. 15. "Representative Mills, after the conference committee
reached agreement on the final Act, reported to the House: 'It is my belief that the
appropriate deduction was allowed by the House bill and that these provisions of
the final bill, which closely follow the Senate amendments, make no change of sub-
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the wording of the statute. He suggested that Congress ex-
pressed its controlling intentions in the form of an "exception"
clause because it was unsure of the effect of the complicated appor-
tionment formula.46 However, in light of the extended legislative
debates and the plain wording of the basic formula, it appears more
logical that Congress did understand the normal effect of the basic
formula, but was uncertain either of its application to abnormal
circumstances, or of the judicial acceptability of the formula in
light of National Life and Gehner.
It was these uncertainties rather than an intent to supersede the
basic formula which compelled the addition of the "exception"
clause.
The Court was also correct in sustaining the constitutionality of
charging all income with a share of the reserve obligations, thereby
reducing the corresponding reserve deductions allowable against
taxable income. This follows logically from the nature of the deduc-
tion. The reserve deduction corresponds to the legally required
reserve fund of the company. Income utilized to meet these require-
ments cannot be said to represent "beneficial ownership" by the com-
pany, and the reserve deduction simply recognizes that it would be
inequitable to tax such income.47 Income receipts of an insurance
company are fungible, and it is reasonable to assume that all are
proportionately responsible for meeting a pro rata share of the
obligations of the company.48 Consequently, all such income receipts
stance.' 105 Cong. Record, Part 8, p. 10412. He further stated that the final Act
. .. clarified the language of the House bill to make it definite that we do not
intend to tax the interest on tax-exempt securities.' Id. 10414." 333 F.2d at 398.
Brief for Respondent, p. 25. Contra, note 25 supra.
46. Brief for Respondent, p. 30. Atlas Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 333 F.2d at
397.
47. See note 6 supra.
48. "It is... the nature of the life insurance business . .. that the companies' entire
investment income, taxable and otherwise, plays a part in feeding the reserves for
policyholders, in establishing the companies' solvency to the satisfaction of the State
Insurance Commissioner, and in substantiating the recognition taxwise (through de-
duction, credit or exclusion) of their commitment to the policyholders." Wurzel, supra
note 6, at 17. See text accompanying note 41 supra. "Net worth . .. into which
of necessity enter all his [the taxpayer's] assets subject to liabilities and all such
obligations of the tax-payer as the statute permits to be deducted ...is the subject
of the tax to which exemptions are to be applied. . . To say that debts must be
deducted from taxable assets alone, that no part of the net worth of the taxpayer who
owns tax-free securities may be taxed if his debts equal his tax-free securities, is
equivalent to saying ... either that the taxable assets constitute no part of the net
worth or that, even though they are a part, still that part is not taxable. But it is
not to be supposed that a mathematician, an accountant or a business man would
regard the taxable assets as contributing nothing to surplus, or . . . that there
is any basis for saying that net worth could, on any theory be attributed more to one
class of assets than the -other." Missouri ex rel. Missouri Life Ins. Co. v. Gehner,
supra note 12, at 324 (Stone, J., dissenting).
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deserve a pro rata share of the reserve deduction. Applying a part
of the deduction to tax-exempt income necessarily limits the effect
of the deduction,49 but such application is required by the nature of
the deduction and does not result, as the Court suggested in Gehner,
in a denial of the "full exemption."0 Moreover, to hold that the
reserve deduction is permissible in whole against taxable income,
requires the holding that tax-exempt income is not chargeable with
the reserve obligations of the company. In effect this amounts to "a
debt exemption" 51 in addition to the tax exemption granted tax-exempt
incomes. In demanding this, the taxpayer has taken the incongruous
position that tax-exempt income, which by definition is not included
in the tax base, should be granted an additional exemption which
enables it to reduce the existing tax base. Certainly, there can be
no claim of right to such legislative largesse.
The taxpayer conceded that where, as in the Denman case, obtain-
ing tax-exempt securities directly and immediately created obliga-
tions, deductions corresponding to those obligations should not be
applied against taxable income.52 It was acknowledged that this
would be a double deduction. The taxpayer, however, distinguishes
this situation from the instant case on the grounds that here the
obligations are unrelated to the receipt of tax-exempt income; there-
fore reducing reserve deductions as a result of such income is
foundless and in effect taxes tax-exempt income.
[T]he annual increase in reserves necessary to provide for 'policyholders'
claims' is an expense of doing business as a life insurance company which
would be incurred whether or not tax-exempt interest has been received.5 3
Petitioner's failure to recognize . . . (the) difference between the alloca-
tion of expenses which may or may not be deductible depending on how
they are identified, and the denial of deductions for expenses that are
incurred in any event and are denied only because of the receipt of state
and municipal bond interest .. . is the fundamental defect in its whole
argument.M
49. See note 11 supra.
50. Missouri ex rel. Missouri Life Ins. Co. v. Gehner, supra note 12, at 321.
51. "[T]he only assumption on which the rule ... [of the majority in Gehner]
could proceed, . . . [is] that government bonds, because they are tax-exempt, are also
debt-exempt, or may not be used for the payment of debts, when in fact and in
law tax-exempt securities constitute a part of the corporate reservoir of capital, all
of which without distinction may be drawn on for the payment of obligation." Id. at
324 (Stone, J., dissenting).
52. The Respondent considered it a 'logical extension of National Life" to disallow
deductions which is the same, in effect, as setting-off deductions against tax-exempts
for "expenses directly connected" with tax-exempt income. Brief for Respondent, p. 14.
53. Id. at 8.
54. Id. at 49. The petitioner rightly points out that this argument errs in supposing
that the creation of expenses for which a reserve deduction is allowed thereby
requires the final realization of that deduction. Rather, a subsequent acquisition of
tax-exempt income may carry with it certain burdens which rightly affect that reserve
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However, it does not follow that, because annual reserve obligations
would arise regardless of the receipt of tax-exempt income, the two
are unrelated. The fixed nature of the reserve obligation is, in fact,
immaterial in determining an existing connection between company
income and company obligations. The fact is that the company
did receive tax-exempt income; this resulted from the ownership of
tax-exempt securities. The acquisition of these securities may well
have been based upon the receipts from policies giving rise to the
obligations which are presently due and for which deductions are
demanded. If this is the case, to permit deduction in whole against
taxable income amounts to a double deduction for tax-exempt income.
Again, a company's income producing assets are fungible and it is
reasonable to assume that all such assets are equally traceable to
a pro rata share of the company's policy obligations and all investment
income is thereby chargeable with a pro rata share of annual reserve
deductions.55
Moreover, the taxpayer's argument errs in assuming that the reserve
deduction corresponding to due obligations is limited to that in-
come which can be said to have created those obligations. The
deduction, as was pointed out, is applicable to that income which is
responsible for meeting those obligations, for it is that income which
is not truly owned by the company. All income of insurance com-
panies being treated as fungible is applied against company obliga-
tions. Therefore all income, taxable and tax-exempt, is chargeable
with a pro rata share of the annual reserve deduction,56 and tax-exempt
income thereby rightfully becomes a factor limiting the effective
reserve deductions.
deduction. "In short, the fallacy in the formula proffered by respondent and accepted
by the court below is that it assumes that the same allocations and subtractions
must be made on account of the reserve fund regardless of whether the taxpayer
company has, or has not, received income from state bonds. The 1959 Act pre-
scribes different allocations and subtractions. The question, however, is not whether
the tax is more, but whether the changed apportionment is reasonable." Brief for
Petitioner, p. 29.
55. "If the company's investment income, earned at the 'cost' of the annual ad-
dition to the reserve, were entirely from taxable securities, there would be no problem,
and the cost would be deductible in full. [I]t becomes appropriate . . . to allocate
the cost between the two kinds of income produced by it . . . . Certainly some part
of the cost of using the policyholders' funds is attributable to the production of the
tax-exempt interest, and unless Congress is constitutionally required to allow the
costs of producing tax-exempt income to be off-set against taxable income, so reason-
able an allocation can hardly be subject to challenge." Brief for Petitioner, p. 34.
56. "There is nothing to the argument that since the reserve obligation remains the
same whether there is exempt income or not, no part of the obligation is fairly charge-
able to exempt income . . . . The fact is that the annual addition to reserve must be
made up from investment income, whatever its source, and the company owed to
its policyholders a share of the tax-exempt dollar fully as much and in the same
sense that it owes a part of the taxable dollar." 381 U.S. at 249 n.18.
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Viewing the aggregate effect of this act, the Senate Finance Com-
mittee estimated that some 40 million of the 500 million dollars
expected to be derived annually from the bill would result from
charging tax-exempt income with meeting a portion of the reserve
obligations.57 The Treasury similarly estimated that the revenue to be
derived from this charge would be in the neighborhood of 35-40 million
dollars on the basis of 1958 income.m The estimate by the life insurance
company representative was 322 million dollars.59 A more significant
effect, however, than the increase in federal revenue which this act
will occasion, may be the influence which it will have on the pur-
chase of state and local bonds. The respondent amici curi suggested
that an intent to encourage the sale of state and local bonds was the
fundamental concern of the 1959 act, and that the act was intended
to be interpreted accordingly.
The exemption protected by the Congress was not created for the benefit
of life insurance companies or any other investors. They are mere conduits.
State and local governments are the beneficiaries. Without the adjustment
authorized by the Exceptions, the conduit is clogged and the intended state
and local government benefit is dissipated.
60
In 1964 life insurance companies held approximately 3.9 billion
dollars worth of state and local bonds, which constituted 2.7 per
cent of their total invested funds. This represented a decrease from
2.8 per cent in 1959 and from the all time high of 6.8 per cent in 1940.
This 2.7 per cent of total insurance company investments represented
approximately 4.5 per cent of all outstanding state and local bonds.6'
The precise question of what quantitative effect the present in-
terpretation of the 1959 Act will have on sales of tax-exempt securities
has not yet been answered. Some less significant studies have at-
tempted to correlate generally the change in desirability of tax-
exempt bonds with a change in the net returns expected on such
bonds. Senator Talmadge stated in the legislative debates before the
Senate Finance Committee:
One of my constituents goes so far as to make this assertion: Under
present market conditions, taxable utility bonds are currently offered to
yield about 4.6. Under the proposed new tax bill in order to be comparatively
57. The bill referred to in this estimate was the 1958 bill which was essentially the
same as the 1959 bill actually adopted. This estimate was made on the basis of 1958
figures. S. RFP. No. 291, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1959).
58. Hearings Before the Senate Finance Committee on H.R. 4245, 86th Cong., 1st
Sess. 121 (1959).
59. Id. at 317.
60. Brief for State and Local Governments as Amici Curiae, p. 2, United States v.
Atlas Life Ins. Co., 381 U.S. 239 (1965).
61. Id. at 13 n.3.
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attractive municipal bonds would have to yield approximately 4.10. This
excludes the great bulk of municipal bonds currently being offered in the
range of three, three and three-quarters. If full tax-free status is granted
his company would be interested in this type of security on yields as low
as a 3 per cent.62
Senator Talmadge did not suggest exactly how many dollars worth
of municipal bonds or what percentage of such bonds then being
held or purchased by insurance companies would become impractical
investments for insurance companies with the passage of the 1959
Act as presently interpreted.
The respondent as amici curiae presented a study attempting to
relate the returns possible on tax-exempt bonds to purchases by in-
surance companies.63 Municipal bond yields were said to range be-
tween 71 per cent and 68 per cent of the yield on corporate bonds.
If the ratio held at 68 per cent the industry in 1963 could have saved
some 44.9 million out of a total tax collected of 651.0 million if it
had been able to shift 3 billion dollars of its assets to exempt
securities. If the ratio of municipal bond interest to corporate bond
interest had been 64 per cent, the industry could have saved 32
million in taxes by switching 2 billion dollars of its assets to exempt
securities. If the ratio were 60 per cent the reduction possible by
switching to exempt securities was nil. Unfortunately, the amount
which the 1959 Act was expected to affect the return ratio on
municipal securities was not given. Apparently it is too early to assess
the effect of the present interpretation of the 1959 Act on insurance
company purchases of state and municipal bonds. Whether the
detriment to sales of such bonds will more than outweigh the benefit
of the expected increased Treasury revenues remains to be seen. This
much is certain, however, whatever detriment to sales actually occurs
can be no more than a policy consideration for future legislators.
Any claim that tax-exempt securities are constitutionally protected
from all statutory impairment of their tax advantages, whether or
not that impairment is related to burdens rightfully incident to such
bonds, has been forever laid to rest by the instant case.
62. Hearings Before the Senate Finance Committee on H.R. 4245, 86th Cong., 1st
Sess. 45 (1959).
63. Brief for State and Local Government as Amici Curiae, supra note 59, at 12-14.
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Torts-Strict Liability Doctrine Not Applicable
Absent Physical Harm to Person or Property?
Seely purchased a truck manufactured by White Motor Company
from White's dealer, Southern Truck Sales, under a conditional sales
contract. Pursuant to White's express warranty1 contained in
the purchase order, Southern, with guidance from White's representa-
tives, made a number of repairs over an eleven month period in an
effort to correct a defect which caused the truck to bounce violently.
Thereafter, the truck overturned when the brakes failed to function
properly; and when Seely served notice that he did not intend to
make any more payments on the purchase price, Southern repossessed
the truck. Upon Seely's failure to prove that the defect caused the
accident, the trial court denied recovery for repairs. However, finding
breach of express warranty, the court awarded return of the purchase
price and profits lost from inability to make normal use2 of the truck.3
On appeal to the Supreme Court of California, held, affirmed. Upon
the breach of a manufacturer's express warranty, the purchaser of a
defective product may recover from the manufacturer, with whom he
is not in privity, the purchase price and lost profits arising from the
breach, but strict liability will not apply unless the defect causes
physical harm to persons or property. Seely v. White Motor Co.,
45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 403 P.2d 145 (Sup. Ct. 1965).
The modern law of products liability began with the landmark
decision of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.,4 which established the
rule that a manufacturer can be held liable for personal injury to an
ultimate purchaser without privity, if, through negligence in his manu-
facturing process, he created a dangerous product. However, under
the more recently developed theory of strict liability, a manufacturer
may incur liability without privity for physical injuries caused by a
defective product even though he has exercised all possible care.5 All
1. "The White Motor Company hereby warrants each new motor vehicle sold by it
to be free from defects in material and workmanship under normal use and service, its
obligation under the warranty being limited to making good at its factory any part
or parts thereof.... Seely v. White Motor Co., 45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 20, 403 P.2d 145, 148
(Sup. Ct. 1965).
2. The court held that the fact repairs were made over an 11 month period estab-
lished that Seely was not making an abnormal use of the truck. Id. at 22, 403 P.2d at
150.
3. Seely had paid $11,659.44 of the total purchase price of $22,041.76. The amount
awarded for lost profits was $9,240.40. Id. at 19-20, 403 P.2d at 147-48.
4. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916). For a complete discussion of how the
MacPherson rule has been extended with respect to plaintiffs, defendants, and products,
see Pnossan, ToRTs § 96, at 661-64 (3d ed. 1964).
5. R rATEmET (SEcoND), TORTS § 402A (1965). See generally Wade, Strict Tort
Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5 (1965).
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of the early strict liability cases involved either foodstuffs or drink.' In
the fifties, the courts extended the rule to cover products intended for
intimate bodily use,7 and now the Restatement applies strict liability to
"any product in a defective condition [which is] unreasonably dan-
gerous.... ." While many theories have been used to clear the hurdle
of privity,9 one of the most significant was that an implied warranty
either ran with the goods0 or was made directly to the customer. With
Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.," came full recognition that
"the liability imposed is not one governed by the law of contract war-
ranties but by the law of strict liability in tort." 2 There is another
theory of strict liability resting on a so-called express warranty. 13 In
cases espousing this theory, a manufacturer is held strictly liable to a
purchaser who has relied on advertisements or representations as to
the quality of the products and has suffered physical damage as a
result.14 While recognizing liability in this situation, the Restatement15
speaks in misrepresentation and deceit terminology and thereby avoids
confusion of this tort action with a true express warranty case.
Originally, strict liability was limited to actions for personal injury, but
more recently has been applied to cases involving physical damage
6. The first was Mazzetti v. Armour & Co., 75 Wash. 622, 135 Pac. 633 (1913)
(unwholesome meat).
7. See, e.g., Graham v. Bottenfield's, Inc., 176 Kan. 68, 269 P.2d 413 (1954) (hair
dye); Markovich v. McKesson & Robbins, 106 Ohio App. 265, 149 N.E.2d 181 (1958)
(wave solution).
8. RmTATEmET (SEcoND), TORTS § 402A (1965).
9. See, e.g., Madouros v. Kansas City Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 230 Mo. App. 275,
90 S.W.2d 445 (1936) (assignment of warranty from retailer to consumer); Ward
Baking Co. v. Trizzino, 27 Ohio App. 475, 161 N.E. 557 (1928) (consumer is third
party beneficiary); Wisdom v. Morris Hardware Co., 151 Wash. 86 274 Pac. 1050
(1950) (1929) (retailer is consumer's agent).
10. This theory was introduced in Coca-Cola Bottling Works v. Lyons, 145 Miss.
876, 111 So. 305 (1927).
11. 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 377 P.2d 897 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
12. Id. at 63, 377 P.2d at 901. The importance of this recognition is that it elimi-
nates the troublesome warranty concepts of privity, notice, and the manufacturer's right
to disclaim in cases involving physical damage.
13. The Supreme Court of Washington recognized this so-called express warranty
to avoid the privity barrier in Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., 168 Wash. 456, 12 P.2d
409, aff'd per curiam on rehearing, 15 P.2d 1118 (1932), aff'd on second appeal, 179
Wash. 123, 35 P.2d 1090 (1934).
14. E.g., Randy Knitware, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., 11 N.Y.2d 5, 181 N.E.2d
399, 226 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1962); Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co., 167 Ohio St.
244, 147 N.E.2d 612 (1958).
15. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), ToRTs § 402B (1965): "One engaged in the business
of selling chattels who, by advertising, labels or otherwise, makes to the public a
representation of a material fact concerning the character or quality of a chattel sold
by him is subject to liability for physical harm to a consumer of the chattel caused
by justifiable reliance upon the misrepresentation, even though (a) it is not made
fraudulently or negligently, and (b) the consumer has not bought the chattel from
or entered into any contractual relation with the seller." (Emphasis added.)
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to property.16 The most controversial question in the field of products
liability at present is whether strict liability should be extended to the
situation in which the plaintiff suffers only an economic loss. A recent
case, Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc.,17 has answered the question
in the affirmative. Until Santor, it has been necessary for a purchaser
seeking to recover from the manufacturer economic losses not arising
from personal injury or property damage to proceed under the com-
mercial law theory of express warranty, which requires notice of the
defect to the manufacturer, and which allows the manufacturer to
issue disclaimers.
Chief Justice Traynor's negative response to the question, whether
a strict liability action for loss of bargain may be maintained against
the manufacturer by a purchaser not in privity, is the real importance
of the instant case. But the court did allow Seely to recover on the
commercial theory of breach of express warranty. The court ruled
that the promise in the purchase order together with White's promises
over the eleven month period constituted an express warranty to the
purchaser which was breached by the repeated failures to correct
the bouncing, notwithstanding White's attempted limitation of its
obligation of repair and replacement:18 Having expressly warranted
the product to the purchaser, privity was unnecessary.19 Further,
White clearly had notice of the defect. Having established the plain-
tiff's right to recovery, the court affirmed the award of the purchase
price and lost profits as losses resulting naturally and directly from
the breach of warranty. 0 While reaffirming his opinion in Greenman
16. "There is no sensible reason for distinguishing between the two kinds of damage;
and the question would appear to be rather one of choosing the products to be covered
by the strict liability." Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the
Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1143 (1960). This view is supported by RlESTATEMENT
(SEcoND), TORTs § 402A(1) (1965).
17. 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965). Santor purchased carpeting sold as Grade
No. 1 which proved to be defective. No one was injured and plaintiff's damage was
solely that of loss of bargain. As the retailer had moved to another state, Santor
brought suit against the manufacturer seeking recovery of the purchase price. The
trial court decided there was a breach of an implied warranty of merchantability from
the manufacturer to the purchaser even though there was no privity. Judgment was
entered for the full purchase price. The Supreme Court of New Jersey agreed with
the trial court's reasoning, but went on to say that liability could be based on strict
liability in tort. Damages were reduced to the difference between the purchase price
and the actual market value of the carpet. It should be noted that there is no sig-
nificant difference in what the trial court and the supreme court said; for if an implied
warranty of merchantability is held to run without privity this accomplishes the same
result as allowing a strict liability action for loss of bargain. It is possible that there
could have been recovery on the ground of breach of express warranty since the
carpet was sold as Grade No. 1, thus avoiding this extension of strict liability.
18. Seely v. White Motor Co., supra note 1.
19. Burr v. Sherwin Williams Co., 42 Cal. 2d 682, 696, 268 P.2d 1041, 1049 (1954).
20. Seely v. White Motor Co., supra note 1, at 20, 403 P.2d at 148, where the
court is relying on CAL. Co mmncumsA CODE § 2714.
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that warranty theory is not suited to the area of liability for personal
injuries, Chief Justice Traynor argued that the rules of warranty are
still applicable when the only injury the purchaser suffers is a loss of
bargain. He explained that the distinction "between tort recovery for
physical injuries and warranty recovery for economic loss ... rests
... on an understanding of the nature of the responsibility a manu-
facturer must undertake in distributing his products." 21 While it is
just to demand of a manufacturer that his products not create un-
reasonable risks of harm to person and property, it is going too far to
hold a manufacturer strictly liable when his product fails to meet a
purchaser's economic expectations. Had White not warranted the
truck to be free from defects under normal use, it would not be
liable.22 Chief Justice Traynor expressed the opinion that under
strict liability a manufacturer could be held liable whenever his
product failed to serve a purchaser's specific needs, and subsequently
"would be liable for damages of. . . unlimited scope."3
Justice Peters' dissenting opinion contended that strict liability
should apply because the nature of the damage sustained should be
immaterial as long as it proximately flowed from the defect.2 He
argued that it is arbitrary to say that Seely could have recovered on
-the basis of strict liability if the defect had caused an accident, but
that he cannot since he discovered the defect before an accident
occurred. In both cases the defect has rendered the truck unusable.
Justice Peters rebutted the majority's contention that if strict liability
were applied in loss of bargain cases the manufacturer would be
liable whenever the product failed to meet the purchaser's expecta-
tions by saying there would be liability only when the goods are
unmerchantable.2- Instead of drawing the line between warranty law
and strict liability on the grounds of the nature of the damage, the
dissent suggested that it be drawn at the time of the sale by using
the "ordinary consumer"26 test. If the purchaser falls in this category,
21. Seely v. White Motor Co., supra note 1, at 23, 403 P.2d at 151.
22. Id. at 22, 403 P.2d at 150. The court felt that recovery for loss of bargain
should be allowed- even though the manufacturer attempted to limit his liability to
replacement of parts found defective because of the repeated failure to correct the
bouncing.
23. Id. at 22-23, 403 P.2d at 150-51.
24. Id. at 25-26, 403 P.2d at 153-54.
25. Id. at 28, 403 P.2d at 156. The implied warranty to which Justice Peters is
referring is found in CAL. Co mME.RCA CoDE: -§ 2314. The applicable provisions de-
fining when goods would be unmerchantable are as follows: "(2) Goods to be
merchantable must be at least such as (a) Pass without objection in the trade under
the contract description; and ... (c) Are fit for the ordinary purposes for which
such goods are used ......
26. Seely v. White Motor Co., supra note 1, at 30, 403 P.2d at 158. Justice Peters
admits this test will need judicial definition, but he believes the "ordinary consumer"
needs relief from the restrictive warranty provisions.
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the warranty law requirements of privity and notice would be
abolished and disclaimers would be restricted to "situations where
it can be reasonably said that the consumer has freely assumed the
risk...."27
It should be observed that the majority does seem to equate the
proposed strict liability with an implied warranty of fitness for a
particular purpose, while the dissent argues that it should apply
only when the goods are unmerchantable. If the latter, the manufac-
turer's exposure to risks of unforeseen liabilities to ultimate purchasers
is not nearly so great as the majority fears. However, if strict liability
is extended to loss of bargain situations, especially in view of today's
"long-arm" statutes, manufacturers would probably be subjected to
a limitless number of nuisance suits.30 Against this distinct possibility
should be balanced the relative number of times a consumer is
without a remedy at present. Only if the retailer is insolvent, has left
the state,31 or for some other reason is not amenable to suit is the
purchaser remediless. In the great majority of instances in which
the consumer receives an unmerchantable product, a breach of war-
ranty action will lie against the retailer. As for future developments in
this area, the relative uncertainty of direction is indicated by two
more recent decisions. The view of the majority appears to find
support in Inglis v. American Motors Corp.,32 decided subsequent to
27. Ibid.
28. This warranty is defined in CAL. COMMERCIAL CODE § 2315: "Where the seller
at the time of contracting has reason to know any particular purpose for which the
goods are required and that the buyer is relying on the seller's skill or judgment to
select or furnish suitable goods, there is ...an implied warranty that the goods shall
be fit for such purpose.'"
29. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 17 (Smith-Hurd 1956); N.Y. CIv. PIIAC.
LAw § 302.
30. A recent Tennessee case illustrates the handicap a foreign manufacturer faces
when sued in the plaintiff's "backyard." In this action for breach of warranty, the
jury absolved the local retailer of liability, this necessarily meaning that the article was
not defective when delivered to the purchaser, while holding the manufacturer
liable, meaning that the article was defective when the purchaser received it. The
case was reversed at the appellate level. Kyker v. General Motors Corp., 214 Tenn.
521, 381 S.W.2d 884 (1964). If an implied warranty is held to run to a non-privity
purchaser and an action is allowed against the manufacturer for loss of bargain as
the dissent suggests, with the local retailer out of the picture there will be no way
to detect the prejudice recognized to exist against foreign manufacturers.
31. Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., supra note 17.
32. 3 Ohio St. 2d 132, 209 N.E.2d 583 (1965). This holding is more liberal than
that in Seely for here the express warranty was simply the manufacturer's mass ad-
vertising; whereas in Seely there was the written promise in the purchase order and
the repeated promises to the purchaser over the next 11 months. However,
Inglis does not go as far as the dissent in Seely advocates. Justice Peters in Seely
would say the manufacturer would be liable even if he had not expressly warranted
the automobile through advertisements. The opinion in Inglis is not clear because the
court in allowing recovery for breach of express warranty cites Santor and quotes
passages from it in which the New Jersey court was affirming the purchaser's right to
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the instant case. The court allowed the purchaser of a defective
automobile, who had. relied on the manufacturer's mass advertising
to recover for loss of bargain on the basis of breach of express
warranty, notwithstanding the absence of privity, while holding that
a cause of action did not lie in tort. In an even more recent case,
Price v. Gatlin,3 the Supreme Court of Oregon expressly reserved
opinion on the issue of whether a non-privity purchaser may maintain
a strict liability loss of bargain action against the manufacturer, but
indicated support for the negative answer of the Seely majority.M
However, a strong three-judge dissent approved the Santor decision.
recover for breach of an implied warranty of merchantability. Id. at 136, 209 N.E.2d
at 587. It may well be that the Ohio Supreme Court will shortly adopt the position
of the Seely dissent and the Santor decision when confronted with a case in which
no express warranty can be found.
33. 405 P.2d 502 (Ore. 1965). The holding in this case was that a purchaser could
not recover economic losses alone from a non-privity wholesaler who was not at
fault.
34. "We believe, however, that the social and economic reasons which courts else-
where have given for extending enterprise liability to the victims of physical injury
are not equally persuasive in a case of a disappointed buyer of personal property."
Id. at 503.
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